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I. INTRODUCTION
Following his historic transatlantic journey and successfully landing his
Spirit of St. Louis single-engine airplane in Paris on May 21, 1927, Charles
Lindbergh became an instant celebrity, the recipient of intense media focus,
the subject of overwhelming public attention, and even an American icon.1
The harrowing flight, the plane named after the jewel of the Louisiana
Purchase but constructed on the wharfs of San Diego,2 and—most especially
—the pilot captured the world’s attention and inspired the country.
American and European newspapers reported extensively on Lindbergh
Further, the author appreciates the assistance, efforts and generosity of Editors Jessica
Howard, Melanie Ryan, Kelly Reis, their fellow Editors and the staff members of
the distinguished San Diego Law Review. The author also acknowledges the personally
complex and most inspiring Charles Lindbergh who still remains a fascinating story, even
ninety-two years after his historic, transatlantic flight. Thank you.
Finally, this work is dedicated to the memory of my grandfathers, Felix C. Cathcart, who
worked diligently as a U.S. naval contractor focusing on the safety of airplane construction, and
Charles G. Clark, who faithfully delivered the U.S. mail by rail to all corners of the
country, when these historical events culminating in the Air Mail Affair simultaneously
unfolded from the halls of Congress to the skies above. Ad astra per aspera.
1. The Flight, CHARLES LINDBERGH, http://www.charleslindbergh.com/history/paris.asp
[https://perma.cc/7B6X-3M64].
2. The Spirit of St. Louis, CHARLES LINDBERGH, http://www.charleslindbergh.
com/plane/index.asp [https://perma.cc/2QAH-FDGX].
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and his activities for decades, filling their pages with everything from
laudable triumph to personal tragedy. And, among his subsequent, multiple
pursuits, Charles Lindbergh even defied a U.S. President.3
On February 9, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive
Order 6591, directing the U.S. Army Air Corps (Air Corps) to assume
responsibility for transporting the airmail effective February 19, 1934.4
On the same day Roosevelt entered his order, Postmaster General James
A. Farley canceled all airmail contracts with the private airlines.5 The result
was disastrous.6 Among other challenges, the Air Corps suffered from
under-equipped aircrafts, and pilots who were unfamiliar with flying at
night and unaccustomed to flying in inclement weather.7 While transporting
the mail in just the first few short months, the Air Corps suffered twelve
pilot fatalities and sixty-six crashes.8
Seven years after his historic flight, Lindbergh remained involved in the
airline industry, working at then Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.9
He was, perhaps, the most vocal, high-profile, and persuasive critic of
Roosevelt’s executive action to remove the commercial airlines from mail
delivery.10 Among other criticisms, Lindbergh argued Roosevelt unjustly
denied “due process” to the air carriers by unilaterally canceling the contracts,11
and he further warned that the ill-advised action gravely threatened the
viability of the nascent airline industry.12
Roosevelt contended his action was necessary, alleging that the previous
Postmaster General of the Hoover administration, Walter F. Brown, “abuse[d]
his power” and steered the airmail contracts to some of the major airlines
following a series of public meetings or conferences occurring between
3. A. SCOTT BERG, LINDBERGH 292 (1998).
4. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93 (Feb. 9, 1934).
5. William E. Berchtold, The Air Mail Affair: A Critical Appraisal of the Administration’s
Recent Blunder, with Suggestions for the Formulation of a Sound and Permanent Air
Policy, 237 N. AM. REV. 438, 438 (1934).
6. See generally Edward Rubin, The Regulatizing Process and the Boundaries of
New Public Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 535, 571.
7. JOHN L. FRISBEE, MAKERS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 50 (1987).
8. Id.; Rubin, supra note 6, at 571.
9. BERG, supra note 3, at 292.
10. Kenneth P. Werrell, “Fiasco” Revisited: The Air Corps & the 1934 Air Mail
Episode, AIR POWER HIST., Spring 2010, at 12, 17.
11. CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM 321
(1st ed. 2003).
12. See BERG, supra note 3, at 292.
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May and June 1930.13 Critics later labeled these Brown meetings with the
airline representatives as the “spoils conferences.”14 Following the change in
political power to a Democratic controlled legislature in 1932, Senator
Hugo Black (D-Ala.) and Congress launched an investigation into how
Brown awarded the contracts to the various airlines,15 which became known
as the “Air Mail Scandal.”16
This issue dominated the news headlines during 1934 with newspapers
reporting every development, including congressional hearings, the Air
Corps pilot fatalities, and the very public feud between Roosevelt and
Lindbergh.17 By March 10, 1934, Roosevelt backed down, ended the Air
Corps operation, and allowed the commercial airlines to resume airmail
service under new contracts.18 Subsequently, Roosevelt also pushed the new
Congress to enact different legislation,19 which heavily regulated the airline
industry and changed the fee structure.20 President Roosevelt signed the
Air Mail Act of 1934, or the Black-McKellar Act, into law on June 12, 1934.21
Although Roosevelt and his Postmaster General, James Farley, reinstituted
commercial airmail service within a few short months, several of the airlines
affected by the Executive order filed suit.22 The outcome unfolded several
years later on December 7, 1942, when the United States Court of Claims
held in Pacific Air Transport v. United States that Postmaster General
Farley justifiably annulled the airmail contracts negotiated by former

13. Justin T. Barkowski, Comment, Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the
Next Generation Air Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Trajectories, and—
Privatization?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 247, 255 (2010); Grant Cates, Airmail and the Evolution of the
U.S. Aviation Industry in the 1920s and 1930s: A Potential Model for the Space Industry
in the Next Millennium, Paper Session at the 37th Space Means Business in the 21st
Century Conference, in SPACE CONGRESS PROC. (May 2, 2000), https://commons.erau.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1207&context=space-congress-proceedings [https://perma.cc/
YC3Y-EQD5].
14. Barkowski, supra note 13, at 255.
15. Paul M. Godehn & Frank E. Quindry, Air Mail Contract Cancellations of 1934
and Resulting Litigation, 21 J. AIR L. & COM. 253, 254 (1954); Black, Hugo Lafayette, (1886–
1971), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/
biodisplay.pl?index=B000499 [https://perma.cc/LN5W-M5BQ].
16. Barkowski, supra note 13, at 255.
17. Werrell, supra note 10, at 14.
18. Justin H. Libby, Comments on the Air Mail Episode of 1934, AIR POWER HIST.,
Summer 2010, at 44, 46.
19. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 438; Rubin, supra note 6, at 571–72.
20. See Timothy M. Ravich, National Airline Policy, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1,
7 (2014).
21. BLACK, supra note 11, at 322; The Air Mail Act of 1934, AVSTOP.COM, http://avstop.
com/history/needregulations/act1934.htm [https://perma.cc/MBV6-SNYB].
22. Government Maps Defense as TWA Sues on Air Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1934, at A1, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1934/02/14/issue.html [https://
perma.cc/928G-6EXF].
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Postmaster General Brown, but the commercial airlines were entitled to
payment withheld by Roosevelt and Farley for the airmail services provided
in January and February 1934.23
After consulting available case law from this time period, this Article
analyzes the Pacific Air decision and specifically considers whether the
President violated the separation of powers and offended due process as
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution when he abruptly canceled the airmail
contracts. In short, is President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 6591 an
example of impermissible executive overreach?
Initially, this analysis considers the facts and circumstances occurring
before and during 1934, while tracing the historical narrative that unfolds
into the controversial Air Mail Affair and ultimately influences the Pacific
Air holding. While recognizing the Court of Claims’s decision, this Article
then investigates alternative arguments available to the commercial airlines
that could have shaped the judicial opinion but the court failed to address.
Specifically, this analysis considers whether President Roosevelt undermined
the constitutionally guaranteed separation of powers when he invalidated the
airmail contracts on February 9, 1934. The U.S. Constitution delegates mail
delivery as a congressional responsibility.24 Additionally, Congress did not
authorize the Secretary of War and the Air Corps to provide assistance
with mail transportation when Roosevelt entered his Executive order. Later,
Congress enacted legislation authorizing this action but not until March
27, 1934.25
Next, this analysis considers whether Roosevelt and the government
violated due process of law, specifically “condemn[ed] the largest portion
of our commercial aviation without just trial. . . . [and without] the opportunity
of a hearing” by canceling the contracts, as Charles Lindbergh contended.26
When canceling an airmail contract or a route certificate, the government
was required to provide the airlines with written notice and a forty-fiveday period to respond.27 However, Roosevelt and Farley failed to comply
with the notice and hearing provisions28 and abruptly transferred the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 649, 789–90 (1942).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
See generally Act of Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, § 1, 48 Stat. 508, 508.
Libby, supra note 18, at 45.
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 660.
See id. at 655–60.
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airmail responsibility to the Air Corps instead.29 When justifying this,
Roosevelt and Farley contended that the airlines participating in Brown’s
spoils conferences successfully conspired to prevent other airlines from
bidding on airmail route contracts, which violated § 3950 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, or R.S. 3950.30 Under this statute, any
violation permitted the Postmaster General to “annul” the airmail contract
without notice and hearing, and the carrier was banned from participating
in any future governmental contract for a period of five years following
the first offense.31
The Pacific Air court decision did not consider these issues.32
Significantly, another court addressed the airline’s due process argument
in another case33 preceding the 1942 Pacific Air decision. In Boeing Air
Transport, Inc. v. Farley, another aggrieved airline from the Air Mail
Affair filed suit, similarly complaining about the President and the Postmaster
General canceling its airmail contract without notice and hearing.34 The
U.S. Court of Appeals granted defendant Farley’s motion to dismiss after
finding that proper jurisdiction rested with the U.S. Court of Claims, but
not before opining the airline deserved notice and a hearing prior to the
defendant canceling the contracts.35
Also gleaned from this time period, additional case law illustrates the
potential for Executive orders to undermine constitutionally guaranteed
separation of powers.36 Although decided a decade earlier, United States
v. Pan-American Petroleum Co. shares very similar factual circumstances
with the Air Mail Affair.37 In Pan-American Petroleum, a federal district
court invalidated a governmental contract with an oil company due to the
fraudulent conduct of the Secretary of the Interior and because President
Harding’s Executive order usurps congressional powers by wrongfully
transferring managerial authority over the naval petroleum reserves.38
After applying the relevant case law, consulting journal and law review
articles, and identifying the relevant statutes, this Article’s objective
29. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934).
30. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 767 (citing Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified as
amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970))).
31. Id. at 745 (citing Rev. Stat. § 3950).
32. See id. 654.
33. Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 765–67 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
34. Id. at 767.
35. Id. at 768.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d 43, 87–88 (S.D. Cal.
1925), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456
(1927).
37. See id. at 53.
38. Id. at 87.
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analysis concludes that President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 6591
wrongfully extended into the responsibility of another branch of government
and violated separation of powers. The U.S. Constitution assigns the postal
duty as a congressional responsibility under Article One, Section Eight.39
Over time, Congress delegated some postal functions to the Postmaster
General.40 Although the President appoints the Postmaster General, Roosevelt
wrongfully substituted his authority for the Postmaster General’s authority
when he entered the Executive order, assigning mail delivery to the Air Corps
and effectively canceling the airmail contracts. In doing so, he essentially
interfered in the postal responsibility that Congress delegated to the
Postmaster General.
Coming close to addressing the due process argument, but without doing
so, the Pacific Air court implied that the contractual language requiring
written notice and a forty-five-day hearing opportunity is inapplicable
because the court found a violation of federal statute § 3950, which
prohibits interference in the bidding process.41 Significantly, the written
notice and forty-five-day hearing requirements are both specified in the
airline contracts, or route certificates, as well as in the congressionally enacted
McNary-Watres Act.42 The court’s reasoning conflicts with the Boeing
Air decision, where that court held that a notice and hearing requirement
is implied in the applicable federal statute, § 3950.43 Unrelated to the
McNary-Watres legislation requiring written notice and a forty-five-day
hearing opportunity, § 3950 prohibits bid interference and addresses
the penalties but lacks specific notice and hearing language.44 Despite
this, the Boeing Air court held that a due process right is “read” into § 3950.45
Finally, additional case law from this time period reinforces the Boeing

39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
40. See Ware v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 617, 632 (1867) (citing Act of Mar.
3, 1825, ch. 64, 4 Stat. 102).
41. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 789–90 (1942).
42. Id. at 656 (citing McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260
(1930)).
43. Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed
1970)); Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
44. Rev. Stat. § 3950.
45. Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767.
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Air court reasoning about the unconstitutionality of denying the airlines
notice and hearing opportunities.46
Admittedly, the facts and circumstances culminating in the Pacific Air
decision occurred decades ago, but the issues involving this decision remain
relevant today as courts continue to grapple with allegations of government
overreach, using the Executive order as a method to usurp legislative authority,
and the scope of constitutional protections. Years later, Lindbergh’s warning
about government’s intrusion echoes as distinctly as the steady hum
emanating from his single-engine monoplane as it conquered the Atlantic
and advanced toward the European horizon on May 21, 1927.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A reasonable amount of literature addresses the Air Mail Affair and its
aftermath as it unfolded in front of the nation in 1934. In public hearings,
a Senate committee investigated former Postmaster General Brown after
he awarded various airmail contracts, certificates, and route extensions
following a series of meetings with airline executives. 47 The Senate
investigation, Roosevelt’s very public dispute with Lindbergh, and the
death of Air Corps pilots fueled the public’s interest, prompting intense
media attention.48 The newspapers wrote extensively about the issue as it
developed from airfields to the halls of Congress. 49 In fact, most major
newspapers printed “a story on the subject half of the days in February
and March” and dedicated 30% of this coverage to the front page.50 In
addition to the newspaper attention, additional writers also pursued this
topic, making it the subject matter of various commercial magazines, textbooks,
and even academic journals.
On May 15, 1918, Congress approved funding for the first experimental
airmail route between New York and Washington, D.C.51 Multiple pieces
of legislation influenced and shaped the issue over the years, continuing
with the Kelly Act of 1925 through the Air Mail Act of 1934.52 Much of
this legislation is broad and far-reaching, addressing both the Postal Service
and the airline industry, which was in its infancy.53 Over the years, various
46. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589–90
(1935); Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 161 (1913); Marchant v. Pa. R.R.
Co., 153 U.S. 380, 386–87 (1894).
47. See S. Res. 349, 72d Cong. (1933) (enacted).
48. Werrell, supra note 10, at 20.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 677 (1942).
52. Act of Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, 48 Stat. 508; Kelly Act, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805
(1925).
53. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 27, 1934, 48 Stat. 508; Kelly Act, 43 Stat. 805.
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authorities evaluated this legislation and considered its impact on various
public priorities, especially postal delivery and airline regulation. This
Article attempts to identify, collect, and analyze these factors to gain a
broad perspective and more acute understanding of the issues and history
affecting the Air Mail Affair.
Conversely, only a limited amount of material discusses the critical
judicial opinion, Pacific Air.54 Interestingly enough, the holding conflicted
with other judicial opinions involving the Air Mail Affair—further clouding
the outcome. Initially, a commissioner heard Pacific Air and found contrary
to the U.S. Court of Claims on some issues.55 Commissioner Richard H.
Akers agreed that Farley justifiably nullified the airmail contracts; he found
that the airlines secured the route certificates through an open bidding
procedure, and the evidence failed to corroborate the government’s assertion
that the plaintiff airlines received these contracts through fraud or collusion.56
Commissioner Akers made his decision and entered his findings on July
14, 1941,57 and the U.S. Court of Claims ultimately decided the case on
December 7, 1942, several years after the Air Mail Affair concluded.58
Significantly, another noteworthy decision preceded Pacific Air, where
a different court agreed with the airline’s due process claim before granting
the government’s motion to dismiss for jurisdictional reasons.59 However,
the Pacific Air decision received anemic attention in the literature,
commentary, and legal analysis,60 especially when comparing the court

54. 98 Ct. Cl. 649.
55. Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 272. Commissioner Richard Akers heard and
ruled on the case before the U.S. Court of Claims. Id. at 259. The evidence spanned
a cumulative sixty-three days between April 26, 1938 and June 11, 1940, when he heard
testimony from a significant number of witnesses in three different locations: Washington,
D.C., Sanford, North Carolina, and Los Angeles, California. Id. Ultimately, he received
more than 769 exhibits into evidence. Id.
56. Id. at 271.
57. Id. at 261.
58. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 649.
59. Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767–68 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
60. Research identified few articles addressing Pacific Air or the litigation involving the
Air Mail Affair. Paul Godehn and Frank Quindry reported the U.S. Court of Claims
finding that the plaintiff airlines violated the federal statute, which contradicts the findings of
the commissioner who initially heard the case. Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at
261, 271–72. Likewise, Kenneth Werrell agreed the court concluded that the airlines
colluded to avoid an open bidding process. Werrell, supra note 10, at 22. Finally,
Benjamin Lipsner solely reported on Commissioner Akers’ findings that the airlines did
not obstruct the bidding process; however, he does not report that the U.S. Court of Claims
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decision to the more voluminous amount of literature discussing the Air
Mail Affair. As an additional resource, case law from this time period
addresses separation of powers as well as due process issues. This case
law assists with understanding how these arguments apply to the Pacific
Air holding.
The Pacific Air holding was the last word on a controversial issue.
However, the court failed to evaluate the separation of powers or the due
process arguments in this lengthy 148-page decision.61 While it acknowledged
the government did not comply with the notice provisions when annulling
the airmail contracts, the court remained silent about a Fifth Amendment
due process violation.62 Likewise, the decision failed to address the
executive action and whether this branch exceeded its authority.63 This
analysis evaluates these twin arguments and how they apply to the holding
affecting such a historic issue.
III. METHODOLOGY
This is not an empirical study. This Article utilizes the multiple available
resources to consider alternative arguments available to the plaintiff airlines
in Pacific Air when pursuing their cause of action against the federal
government. This analysis initially discusses the history affecting the Air
Mail Affair and how these circumstances shape the Pacific Air holding.
In deference to the U.S. Court of Claims’s decision, this Article next
investigates alternative arguments available to the plaintiffs that the Pacific
Air court failed to consider.
After consulting different journal articles, law review articles, and relevant
case law, this analysis compares and contrasts these materials to the Pacific
Air holding. Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v. Farley is especially relevant,
illustrating the significance of the due process issue.64 Recognizing that
plaintiff National Air Transport Company is a similarly aggrieved party
whose airmail contract is set aside, the court comments on the due process
argument before granting relief in favor of the government.65 Although
this decision occurred years before Pacific Air was finalized, the due process
argument for whatever reason does not filter into the later court’s evaluation.66
Although the Boeing Air court dismissed the airline’s petition solely for
reversed the commissioner’s decision. BENJAMIN B. LIPSNER, THE AIRMAIL JENNIES TO
JETS 253 (Jeannette Elder & Linton J. Keith eds., 1951).
61. See generally Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. 649.
62. See id. at 746.
63. See generally Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. 649.
64. 75 F.2d at 765–67.
65. See id. at 767–68.
66. See generally Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d 649.
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jurisdictional reasons, it identified the due process concerns initially raised by
Lindbergh and serves as a valuable resource for this evaluation.67
Similarly, case law from this time period assists with analyzing the
separation of powers issue. United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co.
is analogous to the Air Mail Affair, although the court decided this matter
a decade before the Air Mail Affair unfolded.68 This holding offers a
thoughtful analysis and thorough discussion about the potential for the
Executive order to intrude into the purview of another branch of government.69
Based on this collective evaluation, this analysis found President Roosevelt
violated separation of powers by intruding into the legislative domain as
well as violated the airlines’ due process rights by denying them notice and
an opportunity to be heard when canceling their contracts. Further findings
justify the government acting within the constitutional framework, granting
citizens and businesses alike the opportunity to be heard and allowing an
early developing industry the opportunity to grow without governmental
interference and, assuming adequate regulatory provisions exist, only
reluctantly interfering in its progress. Recognizing that economic success
fuels a country,70 the government that interferes least governs best.
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AIR MAIL AFFAIR
A dynamic history affected the unfolding events of 1934. For several
years following the First World War, mail delivery was the primary source
of income for commercial aviation.71 During these early years of aviation,
passenger travel was less lucrative, so the airlines relied heavily on the
federal airmail subsidies for their fiscal livelihood.72 It was not until 1936
that passenger travel income exceeded the income from airmail subsidies.73

67. Id. at 767–68.
68. United States v. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d 43 (S.D. Cal. 1925), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456 (1927).
69. See id. at 87.
70. Many authorities recognize the economic importance of a country’s standing,
including those identified in Thomas C. Clark, Impact of Nineteenth Century Missouri Courts
upon Emerging Industry: Chambers of Commerce or Chambers of Justice?, authored
by a different Hon. Thomas C. Clark. Thomas C. Clark, Impact of Nineteenth Century
Missouri Courts upon Emerging Industry: Chambers of Commerce or Chambers of
Justice?, 63 MO. L. REV. 51, 51–52 (1998).
71. Rubin, supra note 6, at 568.
72. See Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
73. Ravich, supra note 20, at 7–8.
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During the years preceding the Air Mail Affair, Congress passed multiple
pieces of legislation and different Presidential administrations attempted
to influence airline development. In 1925, Congress enacted the Contract
Air Mail Act, or the Kelly Act,74 authorizing the Postmaster General75 to
privatize the airmail service, create the different airmail routes, and award
those contracts to the lowest bidder. 76 After the carrier demonstrated
dependability, the Postmaster General could exchange the carrier’s airmail
contract for a route certificate for a longer period but not to exceed ten
years.77
Recognizing the value of the aviation industry and its economic potential,
Congress next enacted the Air Commerce Act in 1926.78 This subsequent
legislation authorized the Secretary of Commerce to further develop the
economic potential of the nascent airline industry.79 Then, during the Hoover
administration, Congress passed the Air Mail Act of 1930.80 Also known
as the McNary-Watres Act, this legislation empowered then-Postmaster
General Walter Brown to award airmail routes to the lowest bidder transporting
the mail based on a space-mileage basis, not the mail weight.81 This new
compensation method provided the airlines with a stimulus to transport
passengers as well as the mail.82 Congress intended McNary-Watres to
stabilize the industry and steer the more experienced airlines toward financial
independence and away from the traditional, steady diet of federal
subsidies.83

74. Kelly Act, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805 (1925); Cates, supra note 13, at 1. As the namesake
of the legislation, Representative Clyde Kelly (R-Pa.) is recognized as the father of
the airmail system. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 442.
75. The Postmaster General selection process evolved through history. Originally, the
President nominated an individual who was subject to Senate approval for this cabinetlevel appointment. Ware v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 617, 633 (1867). In 1971,
Congress removed the Postmaster General as a cabinet-level position and reformed the
selection process. U.S. Postmasters General, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L POSTAL MUSEUM, https://
postalmuseum.si.edu/research/topical-reference-pages/postmasters-general.html [https://
perma.cc/BC7A-CNCS]. Instead of Presidential appointment, the Postmaster General is
elected by the Board of Governors of the United States Postal Service. Id.
76. Barkowski, supra note 13, at 253.
77. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 656 (1942) (citing McNaryWatres Act, ch. 223, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259–60 (1930)).
78. Barkowski, supra note 13, at 254 (citing Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344,
44 Stat. 568)).
79. See id. at 254–55.
80. Ravich, supra note 20, at 7 (citing McNary-Watres Act § 4, 46 Stat. 259).
81. H.R. Res. 107, 85th Cong. (1957) (enacted). With this payment change, airlines
were no longer subsidized based on the collective weight of the mail transported. Id.;
Ravich, supra note 20, at 7.
82. H.R. Res. 107.
83. See Berchtold, supra note 5, at 441, 445.
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The McNary-Watres Act empowered Brown. He used his influence to
improve the efficiency of the airmail service as the overall cost to transport
the mail decreased from $1.09 per mile in 1929 to $0.38 per mile in 1933.84
Under this legislation, he extended several airmail routes, hoping to inspire
the airlines to expand passenger service while consolidating the airline
industry into a more manageable entity.85 Prior to McNary-Watres, the existing
airmail routes reflected a haphazard system—a patchwork of “illogical lines”
stemming from only one transcontinental route.86 Pursuant to his authority
under McNary-Watres, Brown bolstered both the airmail and passenger
service by redesigning the airmail map, reconfiguring the north to south routes,
and, perhaps most importantly, adding two east to west transcontinental
routes.87
On May 19, 1930, Brown met with some of the airline executives to discuss
the recently enacted McNary-Watres legislation, his proposed route extensions,
as well as an additional two “independent and competing” transcontinental
routes that the Postmaster General especially favored.88 The post office
disclosed this event to the public and distributed a press release, announcing
the meeting and specifically identifying, by name, the participating passenger
and airmail carriers.89
At the meeting, Brown encouraged the airline executives to meet, discuss,
and decide among themselves which airlines could effectively service the
newly proposed airmail routes.90 When entering its decision years after these
events, the Court of Claims found that Brown told the airlines that he was
not obligated to implement their proposals but “he desired suggestions and
recommendations as to whether [the airlines] could agree on the operator
who should perform the service in a given area and that he would give most
careful consideration to their suggestions and recommendations.”91
Later, critics labeled the airline executive meetings, both with and without
Brown, as the spoils conferences.92 Under Brown’s approach, he hoped to
extend the carrier routes under the existing contracts but without advertising
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
at 700.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 445.
Rubin, supra note 6, at 569–71.
Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 700 (1942).
Id.
Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 262–63; see Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl.
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 698–99.
See id. at 701.
Id. at 702.
Barkowski, supra note 13, at 255; Rubin, supra note 6, at 571.
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for competing bids.93 Brown recognized that some operators were more
experienced, safe, and fiscally sound than others,94 and he undoubtedly feared
advertising would prompt bids from incapable providers or “irresponsible
bidders.”95 In his estimation, a successful restructuring necessitated some
of the multiple, smaller companies to consolidate or merge into a fewer
number of larger, more manageable airlines equally qualified to expand
passenger travel.96
On June 4, 1930, the airlines reported to Brown in writing that they
agreed on air carriers for seven of the twelve routes Brown proposed but
did not agree on a carrier for the remaining, more highly contested airmail
lines, including the two additional transcontinental routes.97 Brown was
disappointed that the airlines were unable to agree on service providers
for the “longer and more controversial” routes and could only agree on the
shorter, less significant routes, which prompted Brown to act.98
Consequently, Brown created and allocated the two transcontinental
airmail routes supplementing the sole transcontinental route operated by
United at the time.99 Pursuant to his plan to establish three independently
operated transcontinental routes, Brown awarded Aviation Corporation
with the southern route between Atlanta and Los Angeles, and he awarded
Transcontinental & Western Air, following their merger, with the central
route between New York and Los Angeles and through St. Louis.100
Under Brown’s direction, the restructured aviation industry thrived and
the amount of passenger travel tripled in the next few years.101 Although
later congressional hearings revealed that Brown was sometimes autocratic
and arbitrary, his vision and leadership elevated the U.S. air transportation
system to the best in the world, all while the country was experiencing the
economic turmoil of the Great Depression.102
As 1932 unfolded, much of the country was experiencing deep economic
hardship as the Great Depression continued, but the fall election marked
a sea change in political power as the Democrats replaced the Republicans
in the White House and both houses of Congress.103 Roosevelt convincingly
defeated Hoover, and the Democratic-controlled Congress catapulted to a

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 701–02.
See Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 265, 269.
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 689, 717.
Rubin, supra note 6, at 570–71.
Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 264.
Id.
See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 708.
Id. at 708, 716–21.
Rubin, supra note 6, at 571.
See BERG, supra note 3, at 291; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
BLACK, supra note 11, at 249–50; see Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
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nearly two-to-one advantage in the Senate and an even more commanding
three-to-one lead in the House.104 With a change in administrations, James
A. Farley replaced Brown as the new Postmaster General.105
Looking to build on their electoral success in 1932, Democrats began
researching issues—“real or fabricated”—involving former President
Hoover that they could manipulate into a campaign issue for the upcoming
1934 midterm elections.106 Brown’s spoils conferences presented this
opportunity.107 Beginning in September 1933, Senator Hugo Black (D-Ala.)
and his Senate investigative committee collected documents, held hearings,
and questioned witnesses about the circumstances surrounding the spoils
conferences, the decision-making to retain the private airlines for mail
delivery, and if this conduct violated federal statutes requiring competitive
bidding.108 The committee subpoenaed the financial records of many aviation
industry leaders, including Lindbergh, even demanding records of stock
transactions since 1924.109 Ultimately, the Senate committee uncovered
some suspicious, questionable activity surrounding the allocation of airmail
contracts, and Black argued that these practices resembled a “conspiracy
to defraud the government.”110
Black’s committee introduced evidence of Brown’s “high-handed treatment”
of some111 but prevented Brown from testifying despite the former Postmaster
General’s repeated requests to appear and defend his policies.112
Understandably, some accused Black113 and his committee of conducting
a less than impartial investigation, and, although effective in generating
104. See BLACK, supra note 11, at 249–50.
105. U.S. Postmasters General, supra note 75. James A. Farley actively participated
in Roosevelt’s initial 1932 Presidential campaign. See BLACK, supra note 11, at 249. When
Roosevelt addressed his supporters on election night, Farley stood next to the Presidentelect who described his future Postmaster General as one of the two people most responsible
for his victory. Id.
106. DAN HAMPTON, THE FLIGHT: CHARLES LINDBERGH’S DARING AND IMMORTAL
1927 TRANSATLANTIC CROSSING 263 (2017).
107. See id.; T.A. HEPPENHEIMER, TURBULENT SKIES: THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL
AVIATION 35 (1995).
108. See HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 107, at 35; Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15,
at 254; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
109. BERG, supra note 3, at 291.
110. Werrell, supra note 10, at 15; see Rubin, supra note 6, at 571.
111. Rubin, supra note 6, at 571.
112. See Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443–44.
113. Black’s professional career prospered under Roosevelt, who appointed him to
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1937. 1 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS:
STRUGGLES FOR POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY 1041 (6th ed. 2005).
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front page headlines, none of the investigation positively influenced public
policy.114
A longtime critic of the airmail system operating under the Republican
Hoover administration,115 Senator Black led the hearings into May 1934,
vociferously arguing that Brown fraudulently allocated the airmail contracts.116
Among other revelations surfacing in the Black proceedings occurring at
the height of the Great Depression, the executive of United Air witnessed
his initial $253 airline investment grow to a value of $35 million.117
While the news of exorbitant salaries of some airline executives shocked
the public, some airlines and their executives understandably profited after
investing in the speculative stock of the airline industry during the bull
market years of 1927 to 1929.118 Some aviation stocks rose dramatically
in the initial market boom preceding the Great Depression, but this rise in
value was not isolated to the aviation industry because other stocks also
benefited as a consequence of the speculation market.119 Just days before
Roosevelt entered his fateful order, Post Office Solicitor Karl Crowley
reviewed the Black committee evidence and issued a brief concluding that
Brown fraudulently awarded the airmail contracts after conspiring with
the carriers to prohibit competitors from bidding on the routes.120
On February 9, 1934, and without warning, President Roosevelt signed
Executive Order 6591, directing the Air Corps to transport the airmail
beginning February 19 and effectively canceling the airmail contracts
with more than thirty different airlines.121 The President argued executive
action was necessary, contending that the Brown airmail contracts were
negotiated through collusion and fraud.122 Officially, Postmaster General
James Farley canceled the airmail contracts on the same day, but only after
participating in a conference at the White House,123 further corroborating

114. See Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443–44.
115. Id. at 442.
116. See BLACK, supra note 11, at 321.
117. BERG, supra note 3, at 291–92.
118. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 444.
119. Id.
120. See Libby, supra note 18, at 44. Karl Crowley was personally familiar with the
events leading up to the Air Mail Affair. Prior to his appointment as Post Office Solicitor, he
worked as a lobbyist for a client seeking an airmail contract, but he was unsuccessful in
obtaining it. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443–44.
121. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934); BERG, supra note 3, at 291.
122. John F. Shiner, Benjamin Foulois and the Fight for an Independent Air Force,
in AVIATION’S GOLDEN AGE: PORTRAITS FROM THE 1920s AND 1930s, at 74, 83 (William
M. Leary ed., 1st ed. 1989).
123. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443.
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that Roosevelt directed the action.124 The following day, The Washington
Post read: “Charging fraud and collusion, President Roosevelt yesterday
directed the cancellation of all air mail contracts with domestic companies
—thus reshaping if not collapsing the Nation’s network of private transport
concerns.”125 In fact, Roosevelt was so anxious to cancel the contracts
and remove the private airlines, he disregarded Farley’s request to delay
the Air Corps start day until June 1 to accommodate a transition period,126
a decision the President undoubtedly regretted.
Later responding to the airline lawsuits, Roosevelt and Farley contended
that the airlines participating in Brown’s spoils conferences conspired to
prevent other airlines from bidding on airmail contracts or route extensions,
which violated federal statute § 3950.127 Violating § 3950 empowered
the Postmaster General to “annul” the airmail contract without notice and
hearing and ban the carrier from participating in any future contract for a
period of five years following the first offense.128 Additionally, the
contractual language allowed the Postmaster General to cancel the certificate
“for willful neglect on the part of the holder to carry out any rules,
regulations, or orders made for its guidance.”129 When doing so, the Postmaster
General was required to provide both written notice and provide the airline
with forty-five days to respond.130 In this instance, the Postmaster General
did neither.131
Before acting, Roosevelt consulted some within his administration. In
the days before February 9, he asked the post office to contact the chief of
the Air Corps, Benjamin Foulois,132 about the Army air arm’s ability to

124. See Ravich, supra note 20, at 7; Rubin, supra note 6, at 571; Shiner, supra note 122,
at 83; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15; Mark C. Mathieson, Comment, Bankruptcy of Airlines:
Causes, Complaints, and Changes, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 1017, 1020 n.18 (1996).
125. Leon Dure, Jr., Roosevelt Cancels Air Mail Contracts; Army Plans to Fill Breach,
WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1934, at A1; see also Werrell, supra note 10, at 16.
126. See BLACK, supra note 11, at 321; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
127. See Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 745, 767 (1942) (citing
Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970))).
128. Id. at 745 (citing Rev. Stat. § 3950).
129. Id. at 660.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 746.
132. In addition to serving as the Chief of the Army Air Corps until 1931, Foulois
was a leader in military aviation and remained passionate about flying, even piloting the
plane that dropped a baseball to Babe Ruth from a height of 250 feet in a publicity stunt
receiving media attention. Shiner, supra note 122, at 78, 80.
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transport the mail.133 Just prior to this time, Foulois was actively lobbying
the legislature and advocating for an independent air branch of the military to
conduct air missions, but both the administration and Congress repeatedly
thwarted him.134 At this time, the U.S. Air Force did not exist, but the
prescient Foulois saw the value of achieving air superiority in combat
situations, and he was the leading advocate for a separate air service that
functioned independently of the Army.135
While he undoubtedly viewed the President’s inquiry as more closely
resembling an order rather than a request, he also considered transferring
the mail as an opportunity to gain support for his plans to convert the Air
Corps into an independent military operation.136 After discussing the matter
with his staff but breaching Army protocol when bypassing the military
Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, Foulois confirmed the Air Corps’
ability to meet this challenge and responded they could be ready in a week
to ten days.137
As one of the first to criticize Roosevelt’s unilateral action and challenge
his executive authority, Charles Lindbergh emerged as the major opponent of
the contract cancellation.138 Although his historic flight occurred seven
years earlier, he was still a national celebrity and active in the aviation
industry where he worked for Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.139
Lindbergh did not serve in any official management capacity within the
company nor did he negotiate the airmail contracts,140 but Lindbergh believed
his employer heavily contributed to the undervalued aviation industry as
well as the economy, and equally important, he believed Roosevelt was
treating the airline industry unfairly.141
Lindbergh sent the President a telegram dated February 11, 1934, and
simultaneously released a copy to the media.142 Among other criticisms,
Lindbergh reminded the President that certain inalienable, constitutionally
guaranteed rights bind us as Americans.143 Specifically, he alleged that
Roosevelt’s decision to cancel the “air mail contracts condemns the largest
portion of our commercial aviation without just trial.”144 Further, he

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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reminded Roosevelt of the fundamental right to a fair trial and alleged the
President’s actions “[did] not discriminate between innocence and guilt
and place[d] no premium on honest business.”145
Further, Lindbergh asserted that companies and their officers “[had] not
been given the opportunity of a hearing and improper acts by many companies
affected [had] not been established.”146 While reminding the President
that America led the world in every aspect of aviation at the time, including
the quality of airlines, aircraft, and equipment, Lindbergh also warned that
the hasty, misguided decision would “damage all American aviation.”147
Within days of the contract cancellation, The New York Times reported
Lindbergh’s fateful comments that “the lives of men inexperienced in mail
operations, and flying planes not equipped with radio or the blind flying
instruments necessary for the service, may be risked.”148
As two of the country’s most popular figures squared off on this
controversial subject matter that later included military fatalities, the Air
Mail Affair unsurprisingly received intense media attention throughout
the first half of 1934.149 Both the President and the partisan Congress
challenged Lindbergh to defend the industry and some of the more
inflammatory revelations that led to the multiple contract cancellations.
For more than two hours on March 16, the media recorded and photographed
Lindbergh in a congressional caucus room where he addressed some of the
aviation industry’s more questionable practices, but insisted they should not
be condemned without an opportunity to be heard.150
While defending his beloved—yet controversial—aviation industry under
the glare of the media spotlight, Lindberg utilized his vast skill set to articulate
well-reasoned, measured, and accurate responses,151 much like how he utilized
a string and a globe to measure the distance between New York and Paris
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Action on Air Mail Unfair, Lindbergh Tells President, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1934, at A1; see also Werrell, supra note 10, at 17. Lindbergh’s prolific flying career
included extensive experience flying the mail. Prior to his transatlantic crossing, he worked as
a pilot at Roberts Airlines, flying the mail between St. Louis and Chicago, where he
frequently endured harsh weather conditions that even forced him to jump from his airplane at
times. THOMAS KESSNER, THE FLIGHT OF THE CENTURY: CHARLES LINDBERGH & THE RISE OF
AMERICAN AVIATION 37–39 (2010); see CHARLES A. LINDBERGH, THE SPIRIT OF ST. LOUIS 6
(1953).
149. Werrell, supra note 10, at 14.
150. See BERG, supra note 3, at 294.
151. Id.
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when calculating the amount of fuel necessary for his transatlantic journey.152
When confronted by multiple detractors and skeptics, Lindbergh demonstrated
unwavering resiliency, resisted the intense pressure of the public spotlight,
deflected the criticism, and communicated153 with the precision of higher
mathematics. Later that same day, Lindbergh endured another interrogation,
this one led by the special assistant to the attorney general and an investigator
from the Black committee while in the presence of a stenographer.154 In
this session, Lindbergh answered questions for more than three hours while
addressing industry accusations and deflecting personal attacks.155
Notwithstanding Lindbergh’s concerns about due process denied, the
Roosevelt decision invited disaster. Even before beginning the operation,
the Air Corps suffered two fatalities on February 16 while conducting practice
flights.156 During the first week of the operation, another three pilots died,
another five were critically injured, and the Air Corps accrued a collective
$300,000 in property damage.157 Beginning with the first Air Corps pilot
fatalities in February and extending into March, each day seemed to unveil
a different “horror story.”158
Several factors contributed to the operation’s demise. Flying combat
missions during the day when the enemy is visible was substantially different
than flying the mail at night for great distances in varying weather
conditions.159 Also, aviation technology was largely undeveloped in the
1930s.160 Further, there were not any radar navigation devices or ground
control coordination to assist the pilots.161
The Air Corps’ planes lacked the blind-flying instruments and radios
that the commercial air pilots utilized while conducting their nighttime
mail runs.162 Foulois recognized this deficiency and he upgraded the
Army plane instruments, ensuring each plane included a radio receiver, a
directional compass, and an artificial horizon in the days immediately

152. LINDBERGH, supra note 148, at 84. While overseeing the construction of his
single-engine monoplane in San Diego, Lindberg located a globe in a public library and
stretched a string across the surface between New York and Paris to measure the distance
of the transatlantic flight, a factor necessary to calculate the plane’s anticipated fuel
consumption. Id. at 83–84.
153. See BERG, supra note 3, at 294.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 295.
156. Werrell, supra note 10, at 18.
157. BERG, supra note 3, at 293.
158. Id. at 293–94.
159. See Shiner, supra note 122, at 84.
160. Werrell, supra note 10, at 17.
161. Id.
162. Shiner, supra note 122, at 83–84.

80

CLARK_57-1_POST CLARK PAGES (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 57: 61, 2020]

3/25/2020 10:56 AM

“The Spirit of” Due Process
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

preceding the operation.163 While the Army hastily trained the pilots on
using the new instruments, many resisted relying on these and instead continued
to trust their flying instincts even when encountering challenging weather
conditions.164 Finally, the 1934 winter weather was especially inclement,
producing considerable amounts of rain, snow, and fog,165 further complicating
the flying conditions. The harsh weather proved heavily problematic as
the Army pilots flew in “open-cockpit machines,” which exposed them to
the punishing elements.166
The decision presented economic consequences as well. Roosevelt’s
action threatened both the airline industry’s stability and its long-term viability,
which invited economic turmoil and jeopardized America’s standing as the
premiere air transport system in the world.167 A successful, efficient airmail
system not only brought “the country closer together” but it fostered a
successful business environment.168 Instead, the Roosevelt decision prompted
economic ruin with many airlines reducing flight schedules and laying off
employees.169 Immediately following the Executive order, Transcontinental
& Western Air President Richard Robbins asked Roosevelt and Farley to
reconsider the decision, explaining the airmail revenue would allow his
company to spend another $3.5 million on new flying equipment in the
upcoming months.170 Instead, the action forced Robbins to furlough employees
and restructure a minimal passenger flight schedule effective February 18.171
At the time of the contract cancellation, the United airline executive’s
massive investment growth172 was an exception to the airline industry’s
fiscal health. In fact, few airlines were able to break even or realize small
profits in 1933, with some even battling massive operating losses prior to
this time.173 Prior to the Roosevelt intervention, Brown’s hope to expand
passenger service and decrease the airline dependence on the mail subsidy
was materializing, because the passenger revenues were increasing to a

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 84.
Id.
BERG, supra note 3, at 293.
Shiner, supra note 122, at 84.
See Werrell, supra note 10, at 15, 17–18.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 17.
BERG, supra note 3, at 292.
Id. at 293; see Werrell, supra note 10, at 17.
BERG, supra note 3, at 291–92.
Berchtold, supra note 5, at 445.
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level where many airlines would have been profitable within three to five
years without the mail subsidy.174
Following an extensive public clamor, Roosevelt eventually reversed
himself. On March 10, he withdrew Executive Order 6591 and allowed the
airlines to resume responsibility for transporting the mail.175 However,
the President insisted that the new airmail contracts restricted the mail
delivery term to three years, not the previous ten years as allowed under
the McNary-Watres legislation.176 Further, he demanded that any airlines
or former participants in the Brown spoils conferences were ineligible for
the newly solicited airmail routes.177
While this new action prevented thirty-one individuals and former airline
executives from participating in future aviation contracts and essentially
banished them from the industry, some of the affected airlines maneuvered
around Roosevelt’s restriction by changing their names.178 For example,
American Airways changed to American Airlines, Eastern Air Transport
changed into Eastern Airlines, United Aircraft became United Airlines, and
Transcontinental & Western Air changed its name to Trans World Airlines.179
On March 27, Congress formally authorized Roosevelt’s action, directing
the departments of war and commerce to assist with mail delivery.180 The
legislative language duplicated the language in Roosevelt’s Executive Order
6591.181 Later that summer, Roosevelt signed the Air Mail Act of 1934,
effectively disassembling the previous McNary-Watres legislation.182
Engineered by the White House,183 the Black-McKellar Act mandated that
multiple federal agencies regulate the airlines and significantly reduced
the postal subsidies.184
The Air Corps’ seventy-eight-day operation was considered a “dismal
failure”185 and by May 8, the commercial airlines were flying the mail
again.186 Before commercial air service resumed, however, the Air Corps
suffered twelve fatalities, sixty-six accidents, and completed just over 65%

174. Id.
175. Libby, supra note 18, at 46.
176. Id.; see McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259 (1930).
177. Libby, supra note 18, at 46.
178. Werrell, supra note 10, at 22.
179. BERG, supra note 3, at 295.
180. Act of Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, § 1, 48 Stat. 508, 508.
181. Id.; Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934).
182. Air Mail Act of 1934, ch. 466, 48 Stat. 933.
183. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 438.
184. Air Mail Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 933; Rubin, supra note 6, at 572.
185. FRISBEE, supra note 7, at 50.
186. BERG, supra note 3, at 296.
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of all scheduled flights.187 If the loss of life was not bad enough, the operating
expenses rose to $0.70 per mile during the Presidential experiment, nearly
double the cost of the commercial airlines operating expenses just months
earlier.188
The Air Mail Affair introduced political consequences as well. Many
concluded that the issue was “a setback and an embarrassment” for the
President.189 Even the President’s own son, Elliott, who worked as an
editor at an aviation publication, criticized his father’s involvement in the
issue.190 Perhaps, the American writer Walter Lippmann summarized the
issue best when he opined that the issue “had deep repercussions for
[Roosevelt]. For the first time since he had taken office, his authority had
been effectively challenged, making him appear both fallible and impenitent.”191
The criticism, the consequences, and the potentially lasting political impact
were not missed on Roosevelt, who later remarked to his press secretary
that the administration would avenge192 this regrettable experience with
Lindbergh while threatening “[w]e will get that fair-haired boy.”193
V. THE PACIFIC AIR DECISION
Nearly nine years passed from the time Lindbergh initially raised his
due process concern on February 11, 1934,194 and the Pacific Air court
ultimately decided the matter on December 7, 1942.195 Before the U.S.
187. FRISBEE, supra note 7, at 50; Shiner, supra note 122, at 84.
188. Shiner, supra note 122, at 84.
189. BLACK, supra note 11, at 322; Berchtold, supra note 5, at 438; Werrell, supra
note 10, at 14.
190. Werrell, supra note 10, at 21.
191. BERG, supra note 3, at 296.
192. And he does. In the years preceding World War II, Lindbergh made a series of
radio broadcasts and public speeches discouraging American entry into the European
conflict. BLACK, supra note 11, at 537. In response, Roosevelt painted Lindbergh as
a Nazi, although repeated efforts to wiretap his conversations failed to reveal any proof.
Id. After the United States entered the war, Roosevelt worked to keep Lindbergh from
serving in the military, despite the former aviator’s determination to fight following the
attack on Pearl Harbor. John J. Dwyer, FDR v. Lindbergh: Setting the Record Straight,
NEW AM. (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/history/item/17341fdr-vs-lindbergh-setting-the-record-straight?tmpl=component&print=1 [perma.cc/76E64E89]. Eventually, Lindbergh overcame these obstacles, and he served admirably for his
country. Id.
193. HAMPTON, supra note 106, at 264.
194. Libby, supra note 18, at 44–45.
195. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649 (1942).
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Court of Claims entered judgment, Commissioner Richard H. Akers
reviewed the facts and issues surrounding the Air Mail Affair and initially
decided the case.196
In fact, Commissioner Akers heard evidence on the matter over a collective
sixty-three-day period that stretched over more than two years between
April 26, 1938 and June 11, 1940.197 He heard from a substantial number
of witnesses in three different venues, Washington, D.C., Sanford, North
Carolina, and Los Angeles.198 He received 769 exhibits into evidence, and
the trial transcript totaled 7,164 pages.199 Ultimately, the commissioner
decided that the Roosevelt administration terminated the airmail agreements
in good faith200 but equally found the evidence “insufficient to substantiate
the claims of the [administration] that these contracts and route certificates
were secured through fraud, collusion, or a conspiracy.”201 Further, he
concluded the plaintiffs were entitled to $364,423.43 in collective damages
for the services performed in January and February 1934.202 Finally, he
decided that plaintiffs were not liable under any of the counterclaims pursued
by the government.203
Although the Pacific Air decision addressed multiple airmail routes and
several different air carriers throughout the opinion, the holding solely
applied to the three different plaintiff airlines operating five specific airmail
routes.204 They included Pacific Air Transport, Boeing Air Transport, and
United Air Lines Transport Corporation.205 Pacific Air Transport was the
plaintiff in No. 43029, involving Route 8 between Seattle, Washington,
and Los Angeles, California.206 It received the contract and began operating
this airmail route beginning September 15, 1926.207 Following two years
of satisfactory service and as allowed by statute, Pacific Air Transport
exchanged the airmail contract for a route certificate on May 27, 1930,
with the Postmaster General’s approval.208 When receiving the route certificate,

196. Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 259. This author relies on secondary
materials in reviewing the decision of Commissioner Richard H. Akers.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 259–60.
200. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 765.
201. Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 271.
202. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 765.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 649.
206. Id. at 654. Originally, Vern C. Gorst was the low bidder on this route first
advertised on July 15, 1925, but he promptly sublet this route to Pacific Air Transport with the
Postmaster General’s written approval on March 19, 1926. Id.
207. Id. at 655.
208. Id.
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Pacific Air Transport posted the statutorily required surety or bond.209 On
July 1, 1930, and also pursuant to statute, the Postmaster General extended
Pacific Air Transport Route 8 to include the additional distance between
Los Angeles and San Diego.210 Pacific Air Transport operated Route 8
through February 19, 1934.211
Boeing Air Transport was the plaintiff in No. 43030 and began operating
airmail Route C.A.M. 18 between Chicago and San Francisco on July 1,
1927.212 Following two years of satisfactory service and as allowed by
statute, Boeing Air Transport exchanged the airmail contract for a route
certificate on October 21, 1930.213 When receiving the route certificate,
Boeing Air Transport provided the required surety.214 Although Boeing
Air Transport did not request an extension on the Chicago, Illinois, and
San Francisco, California, airmail route, Postmaster Brown later directed
Boeing Air Transport to expand Route 18 to include an extended route
between Omaha, Nebraska, and Watertown, South Dakota, beginning
January 16, 1932.215
As the plaintiff in No. 43031, Boeing Air Transport also operated Route
A.M. 5 between Salt Lake City, Utah, and Seattle, Washington, which
it acquired from Varney Air Lines, Inc. beginning October 1, 1933.216
Originally two separate routes, known as Route A.M. 5 and Route C.A.M.
32, these routes eventually merged into a single airmail route on May 27,
1930.217 Initially, Varney Air Lines, Inc. was the low bidder on the previous
Route 5 between Elko, Nevada, and Pasco, Washington, first advertised
on July 15, 1925.218 Additionally, Varney Air Lines, Inc. was the low
bidder on another Pacific Northwest airmail route, Route 32, and entered
into a contract with the government to transport the mail beginning
September 23, 1929.219 Later, Postmaster General Brown found that the
209. Id. at 656.
210. Id. at 663.
211. Id. at 655.
212. Id. at 663–64. Similarly, Edward Hubbard and Boeing Airplane Company were
the low bidder on this route first advertised on November 15, 1926, but Hubbard later sublet
this route to Boeing Air Transport with the Postmaster General’s written approval on April
29, 1927. Id. at 664.
213. Id. at 664–65.
214. Id. at 665.
215. Id. at 666.
216. Id. at 666, 670–71.
217. Id. at 669.
218. See id. at 666–68.
219. Id. at 668.
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public interest was better served by consolidating these routes, pursuant
to the McNary-Watres Act.220 Varney Air Lines, Inc. continued to operate
this consolidated airmail Route 5 until October 1, 1933, when Boeing Air
Transport sublet the route with Postmaster General approval and acquired
Varney Air Lines, Inc.’s assets, including “physical properties.”221
United Air Lines Transport Corporation was the plaintiff in No. 43032
after merging with National Air Transport, Inc.222 As the low bidder,
National Air Transport, Inc. was awarded Route C.A.M. 17 between New
York, New York, and Chicago, Illinois, beginning September 1, 1927.223
Following two years of satisfactory service and as allowed by statute,
National Air Transport exchanged the airmail contract for a route certificate
on October 22, 1930, with the Postmaster General’s approval.224 When
receiving the route certificate, National Air Transport posted the necessary
bond.225 On December 28, 1934, and well after the contract cancellation,
National Air Transport, Inc. merged with three other airlines into United
Air Lines Transport Corporation, which assumed the ownership interest
in National Air Transport, Inc.’s cause of action against the Postmaster
General.226
Similarly, United Air Lines Transport Corporation was the plaintiff in
No. 43033 following the National Air Transport, Inc. merger.227 Initially,
National Air Transport, Inc. was the low bidder on airmail C.A.M. 3 between
Chicago, Illinois, and Dallas, Texas, which it operated from May 12, 1926,
until February 19, 1934.228 After two years of satisfactory service and as
allowed by statute, National Air Transport exchanged the airmail contract
for a route certificate on May 3, 1930.229 When receiving the route certificate,
National Air Transport provided the necessary surety.230 Following the
merger in late 1934, United Air Lines Transport Corporation assumed the
ownership interest in National Air Transport, Inc.’s cause of action against
the Postmaster General.231
After Roosevelt reversed himself and restored commercial airmail delivery,
the government prevented any of the more than thirty airlines, including

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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Id. at 668–69.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672.
See id. at 672–73.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 672, 674.
Id. at 674–75.
See id.
Id. at 675–76.
Id. at 672.
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the plaintiffs, whose certificates were canceled on February 9, from resuming
an airmail schedule.232 Eventually, all three plaintiff air carriers merged
into the United group.233 Also within the United group was a management
corporation, United Air Lines, Inc.234 Subsequently, United Air Lines,
Inc. successfully bid on the routes previously awarded to the three former,
separate air carriers: Pacific Air Transport, Boeing Air Transport, and National
Air Transport.235 United Air Lines, Inc. was not prohibited from bidding
on these routes in spring 1934 because it did not possess a certificate
canceled on February 19.236
Ultimately, the Pacific Air court sided with Roosevelt. The court held
that the plaintiff airlines violated § 3950, justifying the Roosevelt
administration’s decision to annul the mail contracts.237 Disagreeing with
Commissioner Akers, the court found that the plaintiffs and other carriers
“made a combination to avoid competitive bidding” through their collective
agreement.238 Further, the court concluded that the plaintiffs entered these
agreements and combinations to prevent competitive bidding for the airmail
contracts at the expense of others seeking these contracts; the same air
carriers sought to preserve the system using the high rates of payment, and
the air carriers wished to remain in favor with the Postmaster General who
enjoyed considerable discretionary power over the industry.239
The majority opinion specifically faulted plaintiffs, the United group,
as well as Aviation Group, the former Transcontinental Air Transport, and
the former Western Air Express for conspiring with the Postmaster General
that they would not bid on contracts during the competitive bidding process
unless the Postmaster General selected that carrier for that specific route.240
The court further held that these same carriers agreed to use their influence
to dissuade others from bidding on contracts.241
In a concurring opinion, Judge Benjamin Horsley Littleton agreed with
the outcome but disagreed with the court that plaintiffs participated in a
combination or agreement “to prevent the making of any bid for carrying
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 766–67.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 764–65.
Id. at 764.
Id.
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the mail,”242 as prohibited in § 3950. Judge Littleton emphasized that the
plaintiffs’ five route certificates were all awarded following an open
competitive bidding process and well before the May 1930 conference.243 He
disagreed that the plaintiffs schemed to protect their rates considering
United Air possessed the only transcontinental airmail route and the Postmaster
General insisted on two additional transcontinental lines operated by
competitors, which was against the airline’s financial interests.244
Although finding the airmail contracts are properly annulled, the court
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to payment for delivering the mail
from January through February 1934.245 Specifically, the court awarded
Pacific Air Transport an amount of $59,519.32 for unpaid services along
Route 8; Boeing Air Transport an amount of $143,441.68 for mail delivery
along Route 18 and an additional $42,931.62 for unpaid services along Route
5; and United Air Lines Transport Corp., as the successor to National Air
Transport, Inc., an amount of $66,748.80 for mail delivery along Route
17 and an additional $51,782.01 for unpaid services along Route 3, totaling
$364,423.43 in damages.246 Likewise, the court rejected the Roosevelt
administration’s counterclaim request.247
Representative Clyde Kelly (R-Pa.) was unimpressed. Like Lindbergh,
he criticized the Roosevelt decision, concluding “[t]here is no showing to
warrant such a drastic and arbitrary act as the cancellation of all contracts
without a hearing. There was no justification for destroying all contracts . . . .”248
Further dispelling any fraud allegations, thirty-one of the thirty-four canceled
airmail contracts were awarded between 1925 and 1927 following a competitive
bidding process that included three to nine interested parties per contract.249
The remaining three canceled contracts or certificates were awarded by
“Postmaster General Brown to the lowest responsible bidder.”250 Significantly,
all five contracts at issue in the Pacific Air lawsuit were awarded following a
competitive bidding process.251
Considerable publicity preceded the Roosevelt decision to unilaterally
annul all the airmail contracts. The highly public Senate hearings and
investigations revealed shocking economic gains by some carriers and their

242. Id. at 794 (Littleton, J., concurring) (citing Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified
as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970))).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 795.
245. See id. at 790 (majority opinion).
246. Id. at 757, 790.
247. Id. at 793.
248. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 442.
249. Id. at 441.
250. Id.
251. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 768.
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owners.252 Among other disclosures surfacing in the Black proceedings,
the executive of United benefited from an initial $253 airline investment
that increased to a value of $35 million.253
With convenient timing and occurring just days before Roosevelt acted,
Post Office Solicitor Karl Crowley issued a written opinion concluding
that the government could cancel the contracts through any number of
methods, including: (1) a Presidential Executive order,254 (2) a breach of
contract action under McNary-Watres,255 (3) an order from the Postmaster
General based on the federal statute preventing bid-conspiring,256 (4) an
order from the Postmaster General upon a finding that the contracts are
fraudulently awarded257 or, finally, (5) a postal regulation permitting the
Postmaster General to cancel contracts when in the public interest.258
Although the Post Office Solicitor cited the Presidential Executive order
as an acceptable method, he advised against pursing this cause of action.259
Instead, he recommended nullification pursuant to the third, fourth, and
fifth methods previously described.260
Ironically, the Post Office Solicitor cited the breach of contract alternative
as a viable option but recommended against engaging the McNary-Watres
statute as the preferred method to discontinue the contracts.261 Specifically,
the statute allowed the government to terminate any agreement if the carrier
failed to observe any “rules, regulations, or orders.”262 Conspiring to circumvent
the bidding process and steer specific route certificates to specific air carriers
arguably violated the Postal Service rules and regulations. Interestingly,
Crowley confirmed this was a viable cause of action, but he still recommended
against Roosevelt acting under this option.263

252. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 444.
253. BERG, supra note 3, at 291–92.
254. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 748 (citing Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 101, § 5,
48 Stat. 283, 305).
255. Id. (citing McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, 46 Stat. 259 (1930)).
256. Id. (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970)).
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing U.S. POSTAL SERV., POSTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS § 1846, at 679
(1932)).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See id.
262. Id. at 656 (quoting McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260
(1930)).
263. See id. at 748.
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A. President Roosevelt Moved to Annul Airmail Agreements Under
§ 3950, Alleging Competitive Bidding Violations
In clear language, the McNary-Watres legislation authorized the Postmaster
General to terminate an airmail agreement and outlined the grievance
procedure.264 More specifically:
Such certificate may be canceled at any time for willful neglect on the part of the
holder to carry out any rules, regulations, or orders made for his guidance, notice
of such intended cancellation to be given in writing by the Postmaster General
and forty-five days allowed the holder in which to show cause why the certificate
should not be canceled.265

Roosevelt and his administration ignored this cause of action available
under McNary-Watres. Instead, Roosevelt moved to act under a statute
conducive to his narrative of the Air Mail Affair. Section 3950 of the Revised
Statues of the United States states:
No contract for carrying the mail shall be made with any person who has entered,
or proposed to enter, into any combination to prevent the making of any bid for
carrying the mail, or who has made any agreement, or given or performed, or
promised to give or perform[,] any consideration whatever to induce any other
person not to bid for any such contract; and if any person so offending is a
contractor for carrying the mail, his contract may be annulled; and for the first
offense the person so offending shall be disqualified to contract for carrying the
mail for five years, and for the second offense shall be forever disqualified.266

First, Roosevelt pointed to many deficiencies in Brown’s methods. His
administration alleged that the plaintiff air carriers violated the statute
through corrupt, unlawful conduct by avoiding the competitive bidding process
and steering Brown’s newly created twelve airmail routes to certain airlines
and effectively dividing the spoils among themselves.267 Specifically,
Roosevelt contended that Brown circumvented the competitive bidding
process when he awarded the transcontinental routes, assigning these lucrative
routes to his preferred candidates.268 As an example, the administration was
highly critical that Brown awarded the middle or central transcontinental
route to the newly formed Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. after
264. McNary-Watres Act, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. at 260. Through much of the airmail
legislation’s history, Congress consistently included a grievance procedure following a
contract termination. Prior to the McNary-Watres legislation requiring a forty-five day
written notice requirement and opportunity to be heard, the Kelly Amendment specified a
sixty-day written notice requirement and opportunity to be heard on any cancellation.
Kelly Amendment, ch. 603, sec. 2, § 6, 45 Stat. 594, 594 (1928).
265. McNary-Watres Act, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. at 260.
266. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 767 (citing Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified
as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970))).
267. See id.
268. Id. at 786.
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Brown suggested this merger.269 Even more important to his critics, Brown
disregarded a competitor’s lower bid.270
Second, Roosevelt asserted that Brown abused his discretion when
interpreting the statutory language to award route extensions, or a new,
separate airmail route stemming from the main route, to a specific air
carrier while avoiding the competitive bidding process.271 For example,
Brown awarded a carrier with an extension route understanding that the
same air carrier would later sublet the route to a different carrier meeting
Brown’s approval.272 In effect, this was awarding a route to the latter air
carrier without competitive bidding.273
Third, the Roosevelt administration faulted Brown for converting the
airmail contracts into route certificates and extending the parties’ contractual
obligation into as long as a ten-year term, although the statute allowed
this.274 Intent on changing this discretionary power, Roosevelt persuaded
the heavily Democratic Congress in 1934 to eliminate the certificate conversion
option and effectively terminate the ten-year contractual term.275
Finally, the Roosevelt administration also criticized the payment methods
funding the operators and, likewise, it persuaded a subsequent Congress
to eliminate Brown’s space-weight system and lower the fees to “[not]
exceed 331/3 cents per airplane-mile for transporting a mail load not [to
exceed] three hundred pounds.”276
B. Brown Aimed to Develop Air Travel System Following
McNary-Watres Legislation
Between 1925 and 1927 and before Walter Brown’s arrival, the previous
Postmaster General both advertised and competitively bid each proposed
269. See id. at 720. Transcontinental &Western Air, Inc. received the middle route,
which was defined as New York to Los Angeles through St. Louis. Id. at 711, 716, 720.
270. See id. at 782–84.
271. See id. at 775–76.
272. Id. at 776–77.
273. Id. at 776.
274. Id. at 691 (quoting McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260
(1930)); Berchtold, supra note 5, at 439, 446.
275. Air Mail Act of 1934, ch. 466, § 3, 48 Stat. 933, 933–34; see Werrell, supra note 10,
at 15.
276. Air Mail Act of 1934 § 3(a)–(c), 48 Stat. at 933–94; Special Committee to
Investigate Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/investigations/MailContracts.htm [https://perma.cc/C5LBQDJC].
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airmail route before ultimately awarding each of the five contracts involved
in the lawsuit.277 Following his appointment as Postmaster General on
March 5, 1929, Brown aimed to support commercial aviation278 by
making the industry self-sufficient and less reliant on public subsidies.279
At this time, the passenger industry was struggling financially with many
passenger routes mirroring the airmail routes.280 Similarly, he recognized
the expense and inefficiency of the airmail system that developed over
time into an “illogical” system of multiple routes with some routes created
through political pressure.281
In February 1930, Brown forwarded his recommendations to improve
the system to Congress.282 The new McNary-Watres legislation reflected
some, but not all, of the Brown recommendations proposed in his bill H.R.
9500.283 Specifically, Brown recommended that the legislation maintain
a competitive bidding clause but the Postmaster General should retain the
flexibility to award certain airmail routes through negotiation when in the
“public interest.”284 While he recognized competitive bidding was cost-effective,
efficient, and preferable in almost all other governmental spending decisions,
Brown believed that competitive bidding was a “myth” in the airmail
business because only a “limited number of prospective responsible bidders”
existed in the industry.285
To Brown, his proposal to award contracts through negotiation was
critical to shielding the Postal Service from irresponsible bidders who were
less experienced, possibly unsafe, and fiscally unsound.286 His attempt to
balance the industry with a healthy representation of responsible and selfsufficient providers was also reflected in his frequently repeated decision
first announced at the May 1930 conference to add two additional
transcontinental routes “independently and competitively owned.”287 Under
Brown’s approach, the additional east to west transcontinental routes made
the transportation system more efficient by reaching more of the country.
Then, he could consolidate or even eliminate some of the multiple, illogical
shorter lines.288

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
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Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 768.
Id. at 684; U.S. Postmasters General, supra note 75.
See Berchtold, supra note 5, at 445–46; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 684, 772.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 685 (citing H.R. 9500, 71st Cong. (1930) (enacted)).
See id. at 695.
See H.R. 9500, § 4.
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 688.
See Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 265, 269.
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 700, 708, 718.
Id. at 700.
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Additionally, Brown’s proposed H.R. 9500 recommended that the
Postmaster General make any route extensions or consolidations when in
the public interest to do so.289 To promote passenger travel, he further
recommended a payment system based on a space-mileage basis, thus
abandoning the previous system of subsidizing mail delivery based on the
weight of the mail transported.290 By revising the payment system, the
passenger airlines utilizing larger planes could transport the mail as well.291
Ultimately, Congress passed the McNary-Watres legislation, which was
later signed by President Hoover on April 29, 1930.292 The new legislation
denied Brown’s proposal to award contracts by negotiation and without
advertising, in favor of the traditional approach embracing a competitive
bidding process.293 However, the new legislation allowed the Postmaster
General to make both route extensions and consolidations when in the
public interest.294
1. Competitive Bidding
Brown intended to solve “some of the important airmail problems” by
merging this service with the passenger travel industry to create “a
national network of [airmail] and passenger service.”295 Brown attempted
to restructure the illogical, inefficient airmail map that grew over time
without a regard for need by designing an airmail service with the flexibility
to accommodate passenger travel.296 He realized that some airmail routes
were not only unprofitable and expensive, but others were created following
congressional political pressure.297
Further, Brown recognized the value of the competitive bidding concept,
but he also believed it restricted his ability to overcome some of the
industry problems.298 For this reason, Brown advocated for the flexibility
to negotiate with qualified air carriers without advertising and without

289.
290.
291.
292.
at 690.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 686–87 (quoting H.R. 9500, § 6).
See id. at 690 (citing H.R. 9500, § 4).
See H.R. Res. 107, 85th Cong. (1957) (enacted).
McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, 46 Stat. 259 (1930); Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl.
See McNary-Watres Act § 4, 46 Stat. at 259.
Id. at 259–60.
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 683, 700.
See id. at 684, 688, 770.
See id. at 683, 769–70.
See id. at 770.
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competitive bidding because of the “limited number of prospective
responsible bidders.”299
Despite Brown’s preference, competitive bidding remained statutorily
required when Congress passed McNary-Watres in Spring 1930.300 However,
this new legislation expanded the Postmaster General’s discretion over
passenger travel, which was struggling financially.301 Recognizing that
many passenger routes mirrored the airmail routes, Brown aimed to expand
passenger travel, improve efficiency, and reduce rates by combining services,
specifically allowing mail carriers to transport passengers as well as the
mail.302
By creating a comprehensive national passenger and airmail service,
Brown attempted to grow the industry, expand competition, and enhance
the quality of service.303 Much of Brown’s conduct involving the
transcontinental routes revealed his motives, captured his concerns, and
illuminated his intentions. Recognizing there were a “limited number” of
capable carriers, Brown believed Aviation Corporation (Aviation) was the
most responsible air carrier to operate the southern route between Atlanta,
Georgia, and Los Angeles, California.304 The carrier fit Brown’s criteria as a
strong, dependable operator, one of only a few qualified to manage this
demanding route.305 Further, it was “separately owned” and competitively
managed from the other candidates that operated or sought to operate another
transcontinental passage.306 Additionally, Brown expected Aviation to
distribute portions of the route to other qualified air carriers307 after considering
“the pioneering rights,” a term reflecting an air carrier’s commitment and
length of service to a region.308 Aviation did this. When it merged with Delta
airlines in July 1930, Aviation agreed to subcontract an extension from
either Atlanta, Georgia, or Birmingham, Alabama, to Dallas, Texas, to Delta,
assuming Aviation received the southern transcontinental route.309

299. Id. at 688.
300. Id. at 771 (citing McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, 46 Stat. 259 (1930)).
301. Id. at 697, 771–72.
302. See id. at 683–84, 771; Berchtold, supra note 5, at 438; Werrell, supra note 10, at
15.
303. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 770, 773; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
304. See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 688–89, 716–17.
305. Id. at 717.
306. Id. at 708, 717, 779.
307. See id. at 717.
308. Id. at 688. When expanding the passenger travel and airmail delivery system,
Brown believed in pioneering rights or the equities developed by the carriers in their various
regions. Id. at 688–89. Under this philosophy he deferred to the proven, qualified carriers who
invested time and effort in a region, “created a good will” in commercial aviation, and
helped “persuade[] people to fly.” Id. at 687–89, 772.
309. Id. at 717–18.
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Demonstrating its commitment to this region, Delta was a longtime operator
of airmail routes between Dallas, Texas, and Atlanta, Georgia.310
When awarding the central or middle transcontinental route, Brown
likewise sought a responsible provider, and he remained true to his philosophy,
favoring pioneering rights.311 Following the spoils conference, Western
Air Express and Transcontinental Air Transport were the two primary
contenders expressing interest in the middle transcontinental route.312
Both provided a reliable, proven service to portions of this route between
New York, New York, and Los Angeles, California.313 However, Brown
preferred that these two operators combine their resources to effectively
operate the new route.314 Later, these two carriers merged with Pittsburgh
Aviation to form Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. before the post
office advertised for bids.315
As critics pointed out, Brown awarded the contract to Transcontinental
& Western Air over the lower bid tendered by W.A. Letson’s United
Avigation.316 Letson formed United Avigation immediately prior to the
advertisement for bids and even expressed his intention to dissolve the
airline depending on the contract’s outcome.317 When learning about the
competing bid, William McCracken of Transcontinental Air Transport
suggested that the advertisement require that the bidder maintain at least
six months of night flying experience delivering airmail.318 Subsequently,
the post office included this requirement in the advertisement soliciting
bids for the middle transcontinental route.319 Obviously, this requirement
precluded United Avigation as a bidder because it was a newly formed
carrier without any record of air service, but the newly merged Transcontinental

310. Id. at 709, 778.
311. Id. at 687–88.
312. Id. at 720.
313. Id. at 687, 709.
314. Id. at 720.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 784–85. United Avigation was a separate and distinct entity from both
the United group, which already operated a transcontinental route, and Aviation Corporation,
which was awarded Brown’s southern transcontinental route. Id. at 717–18.
317. Id. at 780–81.
318. Id. at 781.
319. Id. at 781–82. Sometime later, the Acting Postmaster General Coleman asked
the then-acting Attorney General John Lord O’Brian about the legality of the night flying
requirement. Id. at 783. Subsequently, O’Brian advised Coleman that, in his opinion,
this particular requirement was illegal. Id.
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& Western Air was not excluded because Western Air had extensive
experience flying the mail at night.320
Transcontinental & Western Air was “separately owned” and independently
operated from the other two airlines operating the southern and northern
transcontinental route, an important consideration to Brown.321 Additionally,
in Brown’s opinion the new corporation was “strong financially” and
stable economically.322 And prior to the merger, the two carriers provided
a reliable service along the route between New York and Los Angeles,323
further satisfying Brown’s concern for pioneering rights.324
When insisting on two additional transcontinental routes that were
separately owned and independently operated,325 Brown was expanding
the market and generating economic opportunity while fostering a competitive
environment. Arguably, he further improved the efficiency of the airmail
system by adding two additional transcontinental routes and eliminating
some of the multiple shorter lines. Brown’s decision was unpopular with
some, including the Pacific Air plaintiffs. At this time, the United group
operated the only existing transcontinental airmail route between New
York and San Francisco326 and opposed Brown’s plan. Contrary to the
allegation that he colluded with the plaintiffs, Brown’s action clearly opposed
the United group’s interests.327
2. Route Extensions
Additionally, the new McNary-Watres legislation authorized the Postmaster
General to make extensions or consolidations of routes when in “the public
interest.”328 When awarding extensions and making route consolidations,

320. Id. at 780–84.
321. Id. at 700, 708, 779.
322. Id. at 779.
323. Prior to their merger, Transcontinental Air Transport operated an air passenger
service over this same route between New York and Los Angeles. Id. Similarly, Western Air
operated a passenger service between Kansas City and Los Angeles. Id.
324. Id. at 687.
325. Id. at 707–08; see Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
326. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 707. At this time, the United group, the United
system, or United Aircraft and Transport Corporation was the strongest aviation entity in
the country. Id. National Air Transport operated the eastern half of the transcontinental
route between New York and Chicago, and Boeing Air Transport system operated the
western half of the route between Chicago and San Francisco. Id. The United system also
included Pacific Air Transport, and later, in August 1930, it acquired Varney Lines, Inc.
as well. Id.
327. See id. at 707–08. While recognizing the additional transcontinental routes
would impact their business, the United group further realized that Brown was intent on
expanding routes to create a national network. Id.
328. McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 3, § 7, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930).
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Brown could correct the illogical growth of the airmail map.329 He believed
that this legislative language, which he interpreted broadly, allowed him
to designate a carrier for a specific route without competitive bidding.330
When Brown convened what critics later called the spoils conference,331
he assembled the air operators, asked them to recommend specific carriers
for specific proposed routes, and they provided him their recommendations.332
Although Brown believed the legislation allowed the Postmaster General
to extend routes from existing lines without competitive bidding and when
in the public interest, he did not act prematurely. Instead, he sought advice
from the Comptroller General, who ultimately approved one proposed
route extension and disapproved another.333 When responding to Brown’s
proposal to expand air service, the Comptroller General did not discourage
this practice, offering even tacit approval.334 More specifically, or vaguely,
he opined:
No hard and fast rule may be laid down in advance for the determination of
the question whether a proposed extension of an air-mail route—an improvement
of an existing route “by slight additions”—may be made and competitive bidding
eliminated, because the facts in each particular matter of proposed extension are
for consideration and may vary in each case. It may be stated generally, however,
that any extension of an established route must have as its basis the public need
stipulated by the law as necessary to be found and determined by the Postmaster
General, an immediate relationship to the basic project and existing service to be
so extended, and such subordinate relationship to the exiting route as to be
merely an extension thereof rather than a major addition thereto.335

The Pacific Air court noted that Brown awarded only two route extensions
affecting the plaintiffs.336 Initially, the court did not fault his decision to
extend Pacific Air Transport’s route by 120 miles, or the distance between
Los Angeles, California, and San Diego, California, considering the air
carrier already operated the 1141-mile route between Seattle, Washington,
and Los Angeles, California, known as Route 8.337 According to the court,
the second route extension was problematic, reflected decision-making

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 684.
Id. at 699, 775.
See, e.g., Barkowski, supra note 13, at 255.
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 701–03.
Id. at 777.
See id. at 714.
Id.
Id. at 730.
Id.
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contrary to the statute, and undermined competitive bidding.338 Specifically,
Brown asked Boeing Air Transport to operate a 259-mile extension between
Omaha, Nebraska, and Watertown, South Dakota, that extended from Route
18.339 Ironically, Boeing Air Transport did not request this extension because
it viewed this specific route as unprofitable.340 Ultimately, plaintiff acceded
to the Postmaster General’s request with the understanding that Brown would
later designate another operator to sublet this specific route extension.341
Brown never designated another air carrier to operate or sublease the
Omaha and Watertown extension and, as Boeing Air Transport feared,
it operated this route extension at a financial loss until the entire route was
canceled in February 1934.342
Although Boeing Air Transport accepted this extension when it was
“detrimental to [its] interests,”343 the court criticized Brown for failing to
advertise and open this route to competitive bidding as well as cited this
specific example as reason for annulling the contracts.344 Again, the court
failed to appreciate Brown’s collective considerations. There were a limited
number of responsible, competitive operators pursuing any given route,
including this extension between Omaha and Watertown.345 Specifically,
Brown expressed concerns about the “lack of experience or doubtful financial
responsibility” of the other two or three carriers interested in this route.346
3. Airmail Contract Converted into Route Certificate
Similar to previous legislation, the McNary-Watres Act allowed the
Postmaster General to convert an airmail contract into a long-term route
certificate when finding it was in the “public interest.”347 Pursuant to the
statute, the Postmaster General could issue a route certificate to a carrier
in exchange for the airmail contract, assuming the carrier provided a
satisfactory service for a minimum of two years.348 Like a contract extension,
the route certificate could not exceed ten years from the date of the original

338. Id. at 789.
339. Id. at 730, 789. Omaha was an intermediary stop along Route 18, or the 1931mile distance between Chicago and San Francisco. Id. at 730.
340. Id. at 730, 789.
341. Id. at 789.
342. Id. at 731, 789, 795.
343. Id. at 795. In his concurring opinion, Judge Littleton cited Boeing’s objection
to the extension for financial reasons as evidence of disproving that the carrier engaged
in any fraud, conspiracy, or illegal acts. Id. at 794–95 (Littleton, J., concurring).
344. Id. at 789 (majority opinion).
345. Id. at 688, 730.
346. Id. at 730.
347. McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930).
348. Id. at 259–260.
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airmail contract.349 In consideration for a route certificate, the holder delivered
a performance bond to the Postal Service as a form of security.350
As Lindbergh advocated, the lengthier certificates complemented the
airlines’ ability to make sound fiscal decisions, affecting both equipment
upgrades and aircraft safety.351 Congress first recognized the necessity of
awarding air certificates for lengthier time periods when it passed the
Kelly Amendment in 1928.352 The House committee report explained that
increasing certificate length “is necessary because of the fact . . . [airmail
carriers] must necessarily invest large amounts of capital in equipment
and operating expenses without receiving an adequate return under a shortterm contract.”353 Before exchanging a carrier’s airmail contract for a route
certificate, the carrier needed to prove it could provide a dependable service
for a given time period.354
Similarly, the McNary-Watres Congress also embraced this philosophy
and recognized this unique industry required time to implement the substantial
investment decisions affecting the capital, property, and equipment necessary
for undertaking mail and passenger travel.355 Following the recently approved
legislation, Brown exercised this option with all the plaintiff airlines at
various times between May and October 1930, upgrading all five contracts to
route certificates due to expire well after February 19, 1934.356 Complying
with the statutory language, the plaintiffs provided the Postmaster General
with proper surety.357 The 1930 Congress recognized and, as Brown understood,
the airlines invested considerably in everything from airplanes to ground
facilities, and these same carriers made significant, long-term expenditures
and therefore relied on lengthier route certificates to maintain economic
viability.358
As the technology evolved during this time period, airlines were constantly
replacing equipment while faced with twin economic and safety concerns.359

349.
350.
351.
352.
(1928)).
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id.
See id.
See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 743.
Id. at 679–80 (citing Kelly Amendment, ch. 603, sec. 2, § 6, 45 Stat. 594, 594
Kelly Amendment, 45 Stat. at 2.
Id.
McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259–260 (1930).
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 655, 664, 670, 673, 675.
Id. at 656, 665, 670–71, 673, 676.
See id. at 743.
See id. at 742.
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For example, Pacific Air Transport utilized single-engine airplanes when
transporting the mail along the west coast in 1926, but it upgraded its
inventory and purchased three Fokker and six Ford trimotor airplanes in
1931.360 The trimotor airplanes were rapidly outdated and promptly
replaced.361 By 1933, Pacific Air Transport purchased dual-motor Boeing
airplanes functioning with greater speed and efficiency.362 Faced with similar
economic considerations, technological advances, and safety concerns, the
remaining two plaintiffs made similar decisions over the same time period.363
As the parties facing these costly expenditures argued, sooner or later
equipment became obsolete making “long-term contracts imperative.”364
Extending the airmail contracts into certificates following two years of
proven service365 was beneficial and advantageous for both sides. The
Postal Service and its customers benefited from a lengthier contractual
term because it ensured dependable service following two years of proven
performance. Similarly, the carriers could rely on a steady income source
over a lengthy time period, which was necessary for long term planning.
To perform efficiently, effectively, and safely, operators must adjust to
the evolving technology, and this time in history was not an exception, as
all three plaintiff air carriers replaced their trimotor airplanes with dualmotor airplanes between 1931 and 1933.366
Significantly, other countries embraced the lengthier contractual period,
revealing the standard industry practice.367 Recognizing the value of lengthier
contracts, European countries typically awarded air carriers with contracts
for a minimum of ten and up to twenty-five years to ensure effective longterm planning.368
4. Payment Schedule
Also pursuant to the McNary-Watres legislation, Congress adopted
Brown’s suggestion by restructuring the payment schedule.369 Brown believed
the previous rate per pound was costly, unjust, and invited questionable billing
methods.370 Instead of compensating carriers based on the amount of the
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
259).
370.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Berchtold, supra note 5, at 439.
See McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930).
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 742.
See generally Berchtold, supra note 5, at 439.
Id.
Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 690–91 (quoting McNary-Watres Act § 4, 46 Stat. at
See id. at 683.
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mail weight, Brown proposed a payment system based on the amount of
the available transport space, which provided carriers the versatility to transport
both passengers and the mail.371 Subsequently, the Black committee heavily
criticized Brown’s payment system and the subsidies received by the
airmail carriers.372
In 1934, the collective cost to operate the domestic air transportation
system was approximately $25 million.373 Passenger revenues generated
approximately $10 million and Congress allocated approximately $14 million
in airmail subsidies, leaving the air carriers to absorb a $1 million deficit.374
In this same year, however, the government generated an additional $9
million in revenue from selling airmail stamps to the public, resulting in a
reduced $5 million subsidy.375 Although receiving intense public attention in
the Black commission proceedings, this $5 million subsidy was significantly
less than the hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies awarded to other
commercial industries in 1934, according to William Berchtold, the
Associated Press aviation editor at the time.376
Both the Black commission and the Roosevelt administration failed to
recognize congressional intentions involving the payment schedule, according
to Berchtold.377 This legislation did not strive to create a cheaper airmail
service—although this was the outcome—this legislation was “deliberately
designed to build up an air transport system of financially sound and experienced
companies which would . . . become self-supporting.”378 Although criticized,
the revised “weight-space” payment system allowed the Postmaster General
the flexibility to “cut down” the rate of payments when necessary.379
More than justifying Congress’s decision to implement a weight-space
payment, Brown utilized this function over his tenure, and the cost of airmail
declined from $1.09 per mile in 1929 to just $0.38 per mile in 1933.380

371. Id. at 769.
372. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 441.
373. Id. at 442.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 441 (“Representative James M. Mead and Representative Clyde Kelly of
the House Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads made elaborate studies on this subject
long before the Black committee heard its first witness, but apparently economics have
been overthrown for political expediency.”).
378. Id. at 445.
379. Id. at 441, 445
380. Id. at 445.
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VI. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ARGUMENT
The U.S. Court of Claims decided Pacific Air on December 7, 1942,
several years after the Air Mail Affair concluded.381 The court held that
former Postmaster James Farley was justified when annulling the plaintiffs’
five route certificates and that his action did not amount to a breach of
contract violation; however, the plaintiff airlines were entitled to payment
for the airmail services provided during January and February 1934.382
Finally, the court held that the defendant was not entitled to recover on its
counterclaim.383
Originally, plaintiff airlines represented three separate corporations but
later merged into one air transportation entity, the United group.384 The
three different air carriers collectively possessed five different route certificates
when the Roosevelt administration terminated commercial mail delivery.385
More specifically, Pacific Air Transport had an airmail certificate to fly
the mail on Route 8 between Seattle, Washington, and San Diego, California.386
Boeing Air Transport had a certificate for mail delivery for both Route 18
between Chicago, Illinois, and San Francisco, California, and Route 5 between
Salt Lake City, Utah, and Seattle, Washington.387 Likewise, National Air
Transport, Inc., had two certificates: Route 17 between New York, New York,
and Chicago, Illinois, and Route 3 between Chicago, Illinois, and Dallas,
Texas.388
Although this argument is not addressed by the court, President Roosevelt
undoubtedly violated the separation of powers doctrine when he invalidated
the route certificates.389 Congressional authority over the Postal Service
is constitutionally enshrined.390 Specifically, the Constitution empowers
Congress “To establish Post Offices and post Roads,”391 and the courts
concluded, “. . . handling of the mails is a function of sovereignty conferred
directly by the Constitution.”392 Further, the Supreme Court held that this
specific, enumerated congressional power included designating mail routes,
identifying the physical locations of post offices as well as “all measures
381. Pacific Air Transport v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 649 (1942).
382. Id. at 793.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 765.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 765–66.
387. Id. at 766.
388. Id.
389. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. E.g., Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1935); see
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 381 (1819).
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necessary to secure [the mail’s] safe and speedy transit, and the prompt
delivery of its contents.”393
Of course, Congress delegated much of this responsibility to the Postmaster
General.394 Beginning with the Act of 1825, Congress authorized the
Postmaster General to “establish post-offices, and appoint postmasters, at
all such places, as shall appear to him expedient.”395 The court held that
through legislation, Congress conferred to the Postmaster General the power
to terminate a subordinate postmaster by eliminating a specific post office.396
Even after deferring some duties to the Postmaster General, Congress
continued to exert its authority over the Postal Service by enacting legislation,
defining what may be delivered, attributing weight specifications, and
even setting the price.397 Significantly, courts consistently recognized that
“[t]he power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire
postal system of the country.”398
At the time the Air Mail Affair was unfolding, the Supreme Court
consistently rejected Roosevelt’s attempts to usurp congressional powers.
Following Roosevelt’s decision to terminate the commercial air contracts
and well before the U.S. Court of Claims upheld this executive action, the
Supreme Court invalidated different pieces of legislation that impermissibly
transferred legislative powers to different executive agencies.399 In a 1935
decision, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court invalidated a portion of
the National Industrial Recovery Act because it incorrectly delegated a
legislative function to the executive branch.400 When entering his Executive
order that regulated the oil industry, Roosevelt cited § 9(c) of the
legislation, which authorized the President to prohibit the transportation
of petroleum products produced in excess of any state law or regulation.401
His Executive order directed the Secretary of the Interior to create agencies,
establish boards, and appoint agents to oversee the oil industry based on

393. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877).
394. See generally Ware v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 617, 631–32 (1867).
395. Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64, § 1, 4 Stat. 102, 102.
396. Ware, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 633–34.
397. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 732.
398. Id.
399. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310–11 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
430 (1935).
400. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 430–32.
401. Id. at 406–07 (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195,
200 (1933) (repealed 1966)).
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Congress delegating this authority to the President.402 The Supreme Court
found § 9(c) unconstitutional because Congress impermissibly transferred its
law-making function to the executive branch.403 While finding that the
U.S. Constitution did not deny Congress the flexibility to address complex
issues through legislation, the Supreme Court further held that “Congress
manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential
legislative functions with which it is thus vested.”404
Likewise, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Supreme
Court again invalidated federal legislation as an impermissible delegation
of responsibility from Congress to the President.405 Under the National
Industrial Recovery Act, Congress authorized the President to create a code
protecting consumers, competitors, and employees as well as further the
public interest while eliminating “unfair competitive practices.”406 However,
the Court partly invalidated the legislation, holding that “[s]uch a delegation
of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with
the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”407
Deciding Schechter the same year as rendering Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan and during the height of the Great Depression, the Court further held
that the dire economic conditions neither enhanced constitutional powers
nor negated the congressional authority to make all laws, which shall be
necessary and proper for implementing its power.408 “The Congress is not
permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative
functions with which it is thus vested.”409 The very next year in 1936 the Court
invalidated the Guffey Coal Act because it again improperly delegated
legislative power to the executive branch in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.410
402. Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 6204: Power Given to the Secretary of the Interior to
Enforce the Preceding Order, 2 PUB. PAPERS 282 (July 14, 1933)).
403. Id. at 430.
404. Id. at 421.
405. 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935).
406. Id. at 534 (citing National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 196
(1933) (repealed 1966)).
407. Id. at 537.
408. Id. at 528–29; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18 (“To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution . . . .”).
409. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 529.
410. 298 U.S. 238, 238, 311 (1936). Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. triggered one of the most
significant events in Supreme Court history. After the Supreme Court invalidated much
of his New Deal legislation in these holdings, Roosevelt appealed to the people and introduced his
plan to pack the Court in a March 9, 1937, radio broadcast. O’BRIEN, supra note 113,
at 62. Among other judicial reforms, Roosevelt advocated to increase the number of
justices from nine to fifteen. Id. When any federal judge or Supreme Court Justice reached
age seventy but chose to forgo retirement, then another jurist would be appointed under the
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Perhaps the case from this time period most factually similar to the Air
Mail Affair is United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co.411 Decided by
a federal district court in California in 1925, this case presented both
comparable facts and a similar legal issue.412 The court found that Secretary
of the Interior Albert Fall initially solicited, and then utilized, a Presidential
Executive order to fraudulently award leases and contracts to defendant
Pan-America Petroleum Company in the U.S. Naval Petroleum Reserve
without observing a competitive bidding process.413 The court invalidated
these leases and contracts because Fall negotiated these agreements for
personal benefit and because Congress did not vest any specific power in
the President to develop the naval reserve lands.414
Between April and December 1922, the parties entered a series of
agreements where defendant constructed storage facilities at Pearl Harbor
and exchanged the crude oil located in the naval reserves in California for
oil stored at the Pearl Harbor location.415 In Pacific Air, the government
alleged the airlines violated a federal statute by conspiring to prevent others
from bidding on government contracts.416 Similarly, in Pan-American
Petroleum Co., the government accused the defendant of engaging in fraudulent
conduct.417 Ultimately, the court agreed with the fraud allegation, finding
that Secretary Fall negotiated the agreements in bad faith after compelling
evidence surfaced that defendant’s executive director Edward Doheny
gave Fall a $100,000 payment.418

Roosevelt plan. Id. at 65. Later that same spring, the Senate defeated Roosevelt’s courtpacking legislation but only after one of the court’s more centrist Justices changed course
and began voting to validate New Deal legislation. See id. at 128. Legal analysts referred
to this crucial change in vote as the “switch-in-time-that-saved-nine” as well as an event
tipping the court in favor of Roosevelt’s policies. Id. at 62. Between 1937 and 1943,
Roosevelt enjoyed the opportunity to appoint eight justices, including the outspoken Brown
critic, Senator Hugo Black. Id. at 1041.
411. 6 F.2d 43 (S.D. Cal. 1925), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir.
1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456 (1927).
412. See id. at 43, 53, 80.
413. Id. at 53, 80–81, 88.
414. Id. at 56, 80–81.
415. Id. at 48.
416. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 767 (1942) (quoting Rev. Stat.
§ 3950 (1872) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970))).
417. Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 50.
418. Id. at 65, 80–81.
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Evidence of fraud is not the only reason the court invalidated the PanAmerican contracts and leases.419 Unlike Pacific Air, the court identified
the separation of powers problem and concluded there was an improper
transfer of power.420 More specifically, the court held that the President
lacked the legal authority to transfer a power delegated by Congress from
one cabinet member to another.421 When facilitating his effort to steer the
contract or leases to Pan-American Petroleum Co., Fall persuaded President
Harding to sign an Executive order designating the Secretary of the Interior
as administrator to the naval reserve instead of the Secretary of the Navy.422
Fall used the Harding Executive order as authorization to negotiate with
parties and to enter into contracts and leases involving the naval petroleum
reserves.423 However, the Harding Executive order conflicted with legislation
designating the Secretary of the Navy as administrator to the naval reserves.424
The same section of the Constitution empowering Congress to exercise
authority over the post office also empowers Congress “[t]o provide and
maintain a Navy.”425 When Harding signed his Executive order designating
another cabinet official as occupying administrative responsibility for the
naval reserves, he illegally transferred a power delegated to the Secretary
of the Navy by Congress.426 In short, an Executive order cannot reverse
congressional action rooted in constitutional authority.427
[I]t must be held that Congress did not intend that some other branch of the
government could transfer this power to some other officer, or divest the officer
in whom Congress reposed the authority of the power which Congress has conferred
upon such officer exclusively. No branch of the government but Congress can divest
or transfer the power so delegated.428

Decided nearly ten years earlier and potentially persuasive to the Pacific
Air court, the Pan-American Petroleum holding is a harbinger that the
latter court chose to ignore.429 The factual circumstances closely resemble
the events unfolding in the Air Mail Affair. The Pan-American Petroleum
court was confronted with the constitutionality of an Executive order that

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
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See id. at 88.
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id. at 50.
See id. at 52.
Id. at 87.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 87–88.
Id. at 87.
Id.
See generally Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649 (1942).
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transferred administrative responsibility between executive departments
when it conflicted with the congressional delegation of power.430
Similarly, Roosevelt entered an Executive order directing both the
departments of war and commerce to assist the Postmaster General with mail
delivery on February 9, 1934.431 Roosevelt did so when the Constitution
delegated the postal duty to Congress and without congressional legislation
authorizing his Presidential interference.432 Admittedly, Congress passed
legislation authorizing the President to direct the U.S. Department of War
to assist with mail delivery, but this was several weeks later and well after
Roosevelt acted.433 With such a similar factual scenario, plaintiff airlines
enjoyed a powerful separation of powers argument after considering the
Pan-American Petroleum holding.434
Applying both the Constitution and relevant case law,435 the Pacific Air
court could have reasonably found that Roosevelt violated separation of
powers when he entered and signed Executive Order 6591.436 Significantly,
he instructed both the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of War
to assist the Postmaster General with the airmail delivery.437 Specifically,
the President ordered the Secretary of War to provide airplanes, landing
fields, additional equipment, and even pilots as well as additional employees
“required for the transportation of mail, during the present emergency.”438
First, Roosevelt was arguably assuming authority over powers delegated
to Congress by the Constitution.439 Just as the Constitution assigned to
Congress the postal power, it likewise delegated to Congress the power to
“declare War” as well as to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces.”440 Admittedly, Congress delegated some

430. Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 87.
431. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS 93, 93
(Feb. 9, 1934).
432. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
433. See generally Act of Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, § 1, 48 Stat. 508, 508.
434. See Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 88.
435. See generally, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537, 550 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 87.
436. See Exec. Order No. 6591, 3 PUB. PAPERS at 93.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 7, 13.
440. Id. at cls. 11, 14.
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authority to a Secretary of War,441 just as it vested certain responsibilities
in the Postmaster General and a Secretary of the Navy.442
However, canceling the airmail contracts was Roosevelt’s decision, not
the Postmaster General’s decision.443 By doing so, he was usurping the
postal power. The timing is critical. On February 9, 1934, Farley signed Post
Office Department Order No. 4959, officially terminating the multiple
airmail contracts and certificates effective February 19, 1934, further
prohibiting the affected carriers from transporting the mail.444 However,
Farley signed his order on the same day that Roosevelt entered his Executive
order and immediately after he participated in a conference at the White
House.445
Additional evidence points to Roosevelt taking exclusive responsibility
for invalidating the airmail contracts. The Executive order language is
revealing. In the very first sentence of his order, Roosevelt acknowledged
that the airmail contracts are invalidated.446 Later in the same order, he
directed other departments to both assist and provide specific, multiple
resources to aid Postmaster General Farley with mail delivery.447 Roosevelt’s
actions were even more telling. Significantly, Roosevelt selected February
19 as the air carrier’s final day for transporting the mail.448 He did so after
consulting staff and even overruling the Postmaster General, who requested
postponing this event until early June.449
It is almost universally recognized that Roosevelt canceled the airmail
contracts. A plethora of sources identify Roosevelt, not the Postmaster
General, as steering this action, with Roosevelt directing Farley to terminate
the relationship with the airlines and further corroborating the reality that
the President replaced the Postmaster General’s decision-making with his
own.450 Even at the time, this was the public perception. The day following
the fateful decision, The Washington Post read: “Charging fraud and collusion,
President Roosevelt yesterday directed the cancellation of all air mail
441. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 12, 26 Stat. 426, 455; Phila. Co. v. Stimson,
223 U.S. 605, 615 (1912).
442. See United States v. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d 43, 88 (S.D. Cal. 1925), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456 (1927).
443. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934).
444. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 743–45 (1942).
445. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443.
446. Exec. Order No. 6591, 3 PUB. PAPERS at 93.
447. Id.
448. See Werrell, supra note 10, at 16.
449. BLACK, supra note 11, at 321; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
450. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 11, at 321; Ravich, supra note 20, at 7; Rubin, supra
note 6, at 571; Shiner, supra note 122, at 83; Werrell, supra note 10, at 14; Mathieson,
supra note 124, at 1020 n.18.
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contracts with domestic companies—thus reshaping, if not collapsing, the
Nation’s network of private transport concerns.”451 Although the agreements
were negotiated and entered between the carriers and the Postmaster
General, Roosevelt inserted himself and directed the contract termination.
Second, the court could understandably find that Roosevelt violated
separation of powers when he transferred responsibility from one executive
department to another.452 The President can transfer responsibilities among
various cabinet departments.453 However, even in “peace time” the President
cannot transfer powers among cabinet members contrary to a specific
congressional designation. 454 In other words, Congress delegated the
Postmaster General, not the Secretary of War, as responsible for the postal
duty.455
In Pan-American Petroleum, the court invalidated the contractual
agreement because the Harding Executive order transferred authority over
the petroleum reserves from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the
Interior, which directly conflicted with congressional legislation making
the Secretary of the Navy responsible for this task.456 Similarly, Roosevelt
transferred, or at the minimum assigned, some amount of mail responsibility
to both the Secretary of War and Secretary of Commerce without congressional
authorization.457 Admittedly, Congress later approved this action involving
the Secretary of the War, but much after the fact.458 Perhaps recognizing
Roosevelt exceeded his constitutional mandate, the Democratic Congress
moved to protect his overreach.459 Using language virtually mirroring
Roosevelt’s previous Executive order, Congress authorized the Secretary
of War to assist “the Postmaster General [with] such airplanes, landing
fields, pilots, and other employees and equipment” when delivering the mail,
but not until March 27 or a time well after the President canceled the
contracts.460 Also, applying the reasoning of Pan-American Petroleum,

451. Dure, supra note 125, at A1.
452. See United States v. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d 43, 87 (S.D. Cal. 1925), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456 (1927).
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. See id.
456. Id. at 87–88.
457. See Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB.
PAPERS 93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934).
458. See Act of Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, § 1, 48 Stat. 508, 508.
459. See id.
460. Id.; Exec. Order No. 6591, 3 PUB. PAPERS at 93.
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Roosevelt’s decision to transfer the constitutionally enshrined mail power
to other departments—even with the benefit of congressional approval—
was unconstitutional.461
Third, Roosevelt acted contrary to congressional intent when considering
the existing legislation. The McNary-Watres Act directed the Postmaster
General to act when and if a carrier violated the contractual relationship,
excluding any need for Presidential involvement.462 The statute clarified
the termination procedure, if the Postmaster General chose to act.463 The
statutory language is telling and specific. 464 The statute outlined the
cancellation procedures but, more importantly, emphasized that the
Postmaster General must act to nullify the contract.465 Instead, Roosevelt
made the decision, acting contrary to the Constitution and congressional
intent.466
Fourth, the Pacific Air court could also find that Roosevelt usurped
congressional authority because he seized a constitutionally delegated power.
According to the case law, courts are even more deferential to powers
specifically enumerated in the Constitution and the branch entrusted with
these specific duties.467 Arguably, the Court elevated the importance of a
power specified in the Constitution and emphasized the significance.
Specifically, “[w]hen the power to establish post-offices and post-roads
[is] surrendered to the Congress it [is] as a complete power, and the grant
carrie(s) with it the right to exercise all powers.”468
Undoubtedly, Roosevelt justified his aggressive action as a necessary
response to the dire economic conditions. At this point in history, the
country was mired in the Great Depression with many banks and businesses
languishing in bankruptcy and astronomical unemployment stretching from
the urban core to the family farm. Even at the risk of exceeding constitutional
guidelines, Roosevelt likely considered his strong executive leadership as
the cure to rectifying what he viewed as the infectious greed of the private
sector that was undoubtedly contributing to the ills of the country. Not
so, said the Court in a 1935 decision.469 Dire economic conditions do not
expand constitutional powers.470

461. See Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 88.
462. McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259–60 (1930).
463. See id. at 260.
464. See id. at 259–60.
465. Id. at 260.
466. See Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934).
467. See, e.g., In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134 (1892).
468. Id.
469. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).
470. See id. at 528.
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A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States was one of the critical
cases striking down executive action from this time period,471 providing
compelling arguments about the dangers of executive overreach. The
Court was unpersuaded by the government’s position that “the statute
authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave
national crisis with which Congress was confronted” or the argument that
the poor economic conditions invited increasing levels of Presidential
power.472 The Court rejected this reasoning, holding:
But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which
lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do
not create or enlarge constitutional power. The Constitution established a
national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to
be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited
by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to
transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is
necessary.473

In short, the Constitution is uncompromising regardless of the economic
conditions, and governmental authority remains constrained by constitutional
guidelines. Additional legal authority from this time period consistently
rejected executive overreach, as well as exposed examples of the executive
branch encroaching on the terrain of the legislature.474 In fact, A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. reasserted the uncompromising principle of separation
of powers, or the sanctity of a well-defined government, operating within
the framework of the Constitution and under three separate branches of
government as first defined in Marbury v. Madison.475 While universally
praised in legal circles and credited for developing the concept of judicial
review by constitutional law scholars, Marbury v. Madison is the seminal
case establishing the role of the judiciary as an equal branch of
government.476

471. See id. at 551.
472. Id. at 528.
473. Id. at 528–29 (footnote omitted).
474. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 317 (1936) (Hughes, J.,
concurring); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).
475. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 528–29; see Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167 (1803).
476. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173, 176–77, 179.
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Authored by Chief Justice John Marshall,477 Marbury v. Madison defined
the roles of the courts and asserted the judicial obligation to review
governmental action.478 More specifically, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the [C]onstitution is written. To what purpose are
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?479

VII. THE DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
Arguably the Roosevelt administration was premature, shortsighted,
and inequitable when moving to annul the contracts under § 3950 instead
of acting under the contractual language requiring notice and hearing. While
a more pedantic legal analysis of the Roosevelt decision recognizes the
conflict existing under separation of powers, Lindbergh’s criticism was
more compelling, straightforward, and direct: the President and the
government violated due process of law, specifically “condemn[ed] . . .
commercial aviation without just trial . . . [and without] the opportunity
of a hearing.”480
On that same day President Roosevelt entered his Executive order directing
the Army to fly the mail, Postmaster General Farley entered Post Office
Department Order No. 4959, terminating multiple airmail contracts effective
February 19, 1934.481 As justification, the administration cited § 3950,
which prevented the federal government from contracting with any entity
conspiring to “prevent the making of any bid for carrying the mail,” thus
477. Besides writing this landmark opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall was
uniquely involved in the factual circumstances surrounding this case. See GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 12th ed. 1991). As President John
Adams’s Secretary of State, John Marshall signed and sealed the judicial commission
belonging to William Marbury, the lead plaintiff in Marbury v. Madison. Id. On February 27,
1801, or less than a week before then-President John Adams concluded his presidency and
President Thomas Jefferson began his term, Congress passed legislation authorizing the
President to appoint justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. Id. Accordingly, Adams
appointed Marbury on March 2 with his nomination subsequently approved by the
Senate the following day. Id. However, the judicial commission was not delivered to Marbury
before newly elected President Thomas Jefferson and his new secretary of state, James
Madison, assumed office on March 4. Id. Considering their affiliation with the rival
political party, Jefferson and Madison refused to honor the Marbury appointment along with
others. Id. Interestingly enough, Marshall’s brother, James Marshall, was responsible for
delivering the commissions, but unsuccessfully dispatched all of them due to the
volume of late appointments in the final hours of the Adams administration. Id. at 10–
11.
478. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177–78.
479. Id. at 176.
480. Libby, supra note 18, at 45.
481. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 744 (1942).
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negating the necessity of notice and hearing.482 Although previous
legislation and even the airmail contracts required notice and an opportunity
to respond, the Roosevelt administration hoped to dodge due process
guarantees when acting under § 3950.483 Additionally, Farley sent a
telegram directly to the affected airlines confirming the cancellation and
again cited § 3950 as reason for terminating the airmail contracts.484
Many of the affected air carriers, including the plaintiffs in Pacific Air,
responded vigorously. On February 16, Pacific Air Transport, Boeing Air
Transport, and National Air Transport sent a letter to the Postmaster General
protesting the cancellation, requesting the suspension of the order as well
as requesting a hearing on the matter.485 On that same day, United Air
Lines also wrote the Postmaster General, alleging that the cancellation order
was based on misinformation and requested a hearing.486 After receiving
no reply, United Air Lines again reasserted its right to a hearing on March
7, notifying the Postmaster General that the carriers were losing in excess
of $250,000 monthly.487 Not until March 27,488 the Postmaster General
finally responded that the affected carriers could submit a written brief,
which would be considered by the post office.489 On April 14, the carriers
jointly filed a brief, but the Postmaster General did not respond.490
A. Contractual Language Included a Grievance Procedure
After siding with the Roosevelt administration to find a Revised Statutes
§ 3950 violation that involved a complicated, convoluted factual scenario,
the Pacific Air court overlooked a more obvious, fundamental concern.
The contracts and subsequent airmail certificates required a notice and

482. Id. at 752 (quoting Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C.
§ 6421 (repealed 1970))).
483. Id. at 656 (quoting McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260
(1930)).
484. See id. at 744–45.
485. Id. at 745.
486. Id. at 746.
487. Id.
488. Interestingly, or ironically, this is the same day a new, heavily Democratic Congress
enacted legislation mirroring the language of Roosevelt’s Executive Order 6591 and
specifically authorizing the U.S. Department of War to assist with the airmail. See Act of
Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, § 1, 48 Stat. 508, 508.
489. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 746.
490. Id.
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response period in direct, specific language.491 When canceling the
agreement, the Postmaster General should have provided written notice as
well as provided the carrier with a forty-five-day period to show cause or
an opportunity to respond.492 Roosevelt and his administration violated
this contractual requirement and effectively denied due process guarantees.
Admittedly, Farley sent a telegram to the carriers on February 9 announcing
that the airmail agreements would be terminated within ten days, although
the contractual language required written notice.493 However, his telegram
did not outline a grievance procedure and certainly did not offer the air
carriers an opportunity to be heard about the annulment.494 After receiving
multiple inquiries and requests to be heard, Farley informed the affected
parties on March 27 that they could submit a brief, which would be “carefully
considered.” 495 However, this was well after the Air Corps assumed
responsibility for transporting the mail and the air carriers were displaced
from their property interest.496 The Roosevelt administration ignored any
and all requests to reconsider the decision and denied the airlines an
opportunity to contest the decision prior to February 19.497
Besides their substantial investment in equipment, real estate, and
infrastructure, the plaintiffs also possessed property rights in their airmail
contracts. A well-established legal principle, firmly entrenched in precedent,
is that a valid contract is considered property.498 When abolishing the contracts
without notice and hearing, the Roosevelt administration was confiscating
this property interest. Due process prohibits taking private property without
a grievance process, specifically notice of this intention and an opportunity
to respond.499
By denying the air carriers’ due process rights clearly specified within
the four corners of the written agreement, the Pacific Air court also rejected
the consistent, frequently reaffirmed congressional preference for a grievance
procedure.500 The notice and response period is consistently and persistently
required, pursuant to statute.501 Prior to McNary-Watres, Congress passed
the Kelly Amendment, requiring the Postmaster General to provide the air

491.
(1930)).
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
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Id. at 656 (quoting McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260
Id. (quoting McNary-Watres Act, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. at 259–60).
Id. at 743–44.
See id.
Id. at 746.
See id. at 743–46.
Id. at 745–46.
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
See id.
See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 789; Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579.
See, e.g., Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579.
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carrier with a sixty-day period to respond to any written cancellation
notice.502 While McNary-Watres changed certain elements of the preexisting
legislation, such as the length of the response period, the latter legislation
equally embraced the grievance procedure, further reinforcing its
importance.503
Even the Roosevelt administration seemed to recognize its error in
denying due process to the certificate holders while clinging to the alleged
§ 3950 violation. After receiving numerous inquiries challenging the
annulment decision, the administration relented on March 27 and
announced that it would allow the airlines to submit a written brief.504 At
this point, the Roosevelt administration seemed to realize that their conduct
resembled a taking without following a legitimate procedure. They had
not complied with the contractual language, and for the first time, they
seemed to realize their conduct resembled a due process violation.
If the Roosevelt administration remained intent on extricating the
commercial airlines from airmail delivery, the more equitable cause of
action would have been to utilize the escape clause existing in the contractual
language. The Postmaster General could terminate any certificate due to
any “willful neglect” by the holder to “carry out any rules, regulations, or
orders made for his guidance.”505 In fact, the Post Office Solicitor General
identified the breach of contract course of action, along with others, as a
viable option.506 When assailing the air carriers, the Roosevelt administration
alleged that plaintiffs went beyond violating § 3950 and additionally asserted
that they were “guilty of other corrupt and unlawful conduct which justified
defendant canceling the route certificates.”507 Corrupt and unlawful activity
arguably falls within the scope of conduct qualifying as a breach because
it contradicts the government’s rules and regulations. As a more equitable
alternative, the Roosevelt administration could have pressed for termination
by pursuing a breach of contract action, thus preserving plaintiffs’ due
process rights.

502. Kelly Amendment, ch. 603, sec. 2, § 6, 45 Stat. 594, 594 (1928).
503. See McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930); Kelly
Amendment, 45 Stat. at 594.
504. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 746.
505. McNary-Watres Act, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. at 260; Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 656.
506. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 747–48.
507. Id. at 767.
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B. Due Process Rights Exist Under the Fifth Amendment
Prior to the Pacific Air decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that the plaintiff airlines enjoyed a due
process right under the Fifth Amendment in Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v.
Farley.508 Decided in 1935, immediately following the Air Mail Affair,
the court opined that § 3950 would be unconstitutional without a notice
and hearing requirement.509 In its petition, Boeing Air Transport requested
the court prevent the Roosevelt administration from enforcing the February
9 Executive order.510 Ultimately, the court granted the government’s
motion to dismiss only because the court found that jurisdiction on this issue
properly rested with the U.S. Court of Claims.511
The Court of Appeals’s analysis is illuminating. The court considered
both the question of whether or not the Roosevelt administration could
annul contracts without notice and hearing as well as the additional issue
of whether the government could impose statutory penalties while preventing
the plaintiff airlines from bidding on future contracts.512 The Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution specifies that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”513 Before concluding
proper jurisdiction rests elsewhere, the court considered Roosevelt’s argument
that § 3950 “does not expressly provide for notice and hearing” when
annulling government contracts.514 The court disagreed, concluding that
a notice and hearing provision was implied in the § 3950 statute, making
the statute unconstitutional without providing a grievance process.515
Further, the court reasoned that denying plaintiffs their right to notice
and hearing equated to a taking of property, thus violating the Fifth
Amendment.516 Contracts are property according to the court, and the
government could not disregard its obligation to comply with the Fifth
Amendment, even as a party to a case.517 Signaling the significance of due
process and its revered standing within the Constitution, the court further
referenced the language in Ochoa v. Hernandez Morales:

508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
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Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
Id.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 766.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579–80 (1934)).

CLARK_57-1_POST CLARK PAGES (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 57: 61, 2020]

3/25/2020 10:56 AM

“The Spirit of” Due Process
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Without the guaranty of “due process” the right of private property cannot be
said to exist, in the sense in which it is known to our laws. The principle, known
to the common law before Magna Charta, was embodied in that Charter . . . and
has been recognized since the Revolution as among the safest foundations of our
institutions. Whatever else may be uncertain about the definition of the term
“due process of law,” all authorities agree that it inhibits the taking of one man’s
property and giving it to another, contrary to settled usages and modes of procedure,
and without notice or an opportunity for a hearing.518

When the court concluded that § 3950 implied a grievance provision,
Roosevelt could not deny the air carriers notice and an opportunity to
respond regardless of the statutory language, according to the court.519
Admittedly, it did not address the question whether Roosevelt acted properly
when breaching the contracts, but clarified that he could not terminate
these contracts without providing the air carriers with a grievance process.520
By doing so, he offended due process and denied the air carriers their rights
under the Fifth Amendment.
Admittedly § 3950 called for the Postmaster General to annul the
contracts following evidence undermining the integrity of the bidding
process without any notice or hearing, but the Boeing Air court concluded
that this grievance process cannot be ignored.521 Without providing a
notice and hearing opportunity, the statute was unconstitutional according
to the court.522 In sum, Roosevelt’s actions deprived the air carriers of a
recognizable property interest by ending the contracts. Interestingly, the
court described the administration’s action as resembling a “breach,” not
an “annulment” of the airmail contracts under § 3950.523 Conceding
jurisdiction on this issue existed elsewhere, the Boeing Air court acknowledged
another court must decide if the breach—or the Roosevelt decision to
cancel the airmail certificates—was proper or improper.524
Precedent from this time supports the Boeing Air court’s reasoning. In
its opinions, the Supreme Court remained vigilant, frequently upholding
due process as necessary to preserve individual rights, regulate government
conduct, and guard against government abuse. In another opinion from

518.
(1913)).
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 161
See id. at 767–68.
See id. at 768.
Id. at 767.
Id.
Id. at 768.
Id.
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this time period, Blackmer v. United States, the Court defined due process
as “requir[ing] appropriate notice of the judicial action and an opportunity
to be heard.”525 In this case, a lower court found the petitioner in contempt
of court, fined him, and ordered the judgment satisfied following the
seizure of his property.526 When upholding the lower court’s judgment,
the Supreme Court further opined “[t]he requirement of due process . . .
is satisfied by suitable notice and adequate opportunity to appear and to
be heard.”527
Likewise, in Ballard v. Hunter the Supreme Court upheld an Arkansas
statute allowing notice by publication prior to selling a nonresident’s property
due to unpaid taxes but cited additional case law requiring “respect . . .
[as] to the cause and object of the taking” when deciding due process issues.528
In the due process case from 1907, plaintiffs asserted that the Arkansas
statute discriminated against them as nonresidents of the state because it
allowed different forms of notice for resident versus nonresident landowners
prior to selling a property for nonpayment of taxes.529
When upholding the statute, the Supreme Court held that a state is
restricted by boundaries and cannot always manage to personally serve an
out-of-state resident, so constructive service, or service by publication, is
appropriate.530 Decided before Pacific Air as relevant precedent, the Court
found that the essential requirement for due process is an “opportunity for
a hearing and defense, but no fixed procedure is demanded.”531 “The process
or proceedings may be adapted to the nature of the case.”532 Further, the
Court recognized that the government is entrusted with certain taxing powers
or even the power to take property through eminent domain, but fairness
requires a process for the individual to be heard in response to these
actions.533 When applied fairly, proportionately, and appropriately, this is
due process but, conversely, if this process becomes “arbitrary, oppressive
and unjust,” it is not due process of law.534

525. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
526. Id. at 433.
527. Id. at 440.
528. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 242–43, 255–56 (1907) (quoting Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
529. Id. at 254, 264.
530. Id. at 254.
531. Id. at 255.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 255–56 (citing Davidson, 96 U.S. at 104–05, 107).
534. Id. at 256 (citing Davidson, 96 U.S. at 107 (Bradley, J., concurring)).
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The Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the importance of offering
notice and hearing opportunities prior to taking property.535 The Boeing
Air court’s decision absorbed the Supreme Court’s rationale and applied
this concept when considering the due process issues in the Air Mail Affair,536
unlike the Pacific Air court, which appeared to disregard this precedent
when making a decision.537 While recognizing its jurisdictional limitations,
the Boeing Air court concluded that Roosevelt violated due process.538
Besides investing in expensive equipment, property, and even infrastructure,
the plaintiffs possessed a recognizable property interest in the airmail
contracts or route certificates according to the courts.539 Any taking of
property required due process of law and Roosevelt violated this requirement
when he annulled the certificates without notice or hearing.540 He acted
under the authority of § 3950 but at least one court found this statute
unconstitutional without a grievance process.541
Additionally, the contract length elevated the value of the plaintiffs’
property and enhanced their damages. After two years of proven, capable
service, each plaintiff or their predecessor in interest received an airmail
certificate for an extended number of years.542 Arguably, this lengthy
contractual term multiplied the revenue and increased the plaintiff’s property
interest. Under these circumstances, a taking of property without some form
of notice and hearing seems completely contrary to court precedent.543
Considering the plaintiffs enjoyed a property interest in a written agreement
extending over as many as ten years, there was much to lose. This taking
without a hearing amounts to a property loss compounded over multiple
years in multiple amounts. To sanction the Roosevelt action without allowing
some form of a grievance process seems contrary to prevalent court precedent
and fundamentally unfair.

535. E.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Ochoa v. Hernandez y
Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 161 (1913); Ballard, 204 U.S. at 255–56 (citing Davidson, 96 U.S. at
104–05).
536. Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
537. See Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 789 (1942).
538. Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767–68.
539. Id. at 767 (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934)).
540. See supra Section VII.A.
541. Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767.
542. McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259–60 (1930); see Pac. Air
Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 654.
543. See Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767 (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579).
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The factual circumstances offer an equally compelling narrative. The
Roosevelt administration abruptly canceled thirty-four total airmail contracts
with more than thirty different companies on February 9.544 Of that number,
thirty-one were awarded between 1925 and 1927 under competitive bidding
procedures where there were three to nine competitors for each contract.545
The remaining three were awarded in 1930 to the lowest responsible bidder.546
Summarily, the Pacific Air decision involved only three carriers and their
respective five collective airmail routes. All five airmail contracts were
initially awarded following an open, competitive bidding process pursuant
to statute.547 Significantly, all five airmail contracts were initially awarded
between 1926 and 1927,548 well before the May 1930 spoils conferences
and even prior to Walter Brown’s appointment as Postmaster General on
March 4, 1929.549 Considering the five contracts were awarded following
an open, competitive bidding process and increased in value to multiple
year agreements, Roosevelt’s move to terminate the succeeding air certificates
within ten days and without a grievance procedure resembled an “arbitrary,
oppressive, and unjust” process as described by earlier courts.550
VIII. MORE RECENT USE OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
Among other recent Presidents who have been criticized for executive
overreach, former President Barrack Obama embraced the unilateral power
of the Executive order to reshape the nation through sweeping regulations.551
The Executive order replaced the legislative process and substituted law
made by representatives of the people with law made by bureaucrats.
Arguably, this contradicted the democratic process.
Complaining about a Congress controlled by a different political party
that resisted his agenda during a portion of his two terms, President Obama
entered 560 total Executive orders, involving significant financial and
social regulations during the first seven years of his presidency, which is

544. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 744; BERG, supra note 3, at 291; Berchtold, supra
note 5, at 438, 441.
545. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 441.
546. Id.
547. See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 764.
548. Following two years of proven service by the airlines, Postmaster General Brown
exchanged the airmail contracts for airmail certificates pursuant to the McNary-Watres
statutory language. See generally id. at 654–76.
549. See id. at 682.
550. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 256 (1907) (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96
U.S. 97, 107 (1878) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
551. Binyamin Appelbaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive Power,
Obama Has Come to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/14/us/politics/obama-era-legacy-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/QJT4-FHDH].
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50% higher in number than his immediate predecessor.552 For example,
an executive agency during the Obama presidency awarded “‘lawful status’
on at least 4.3 million illegal aliens,” a move contrary to the congressional
intent.553
As reflected in more recent events, these intragovernmental battles
spilled into the courts. Today, there is increasing evidence of the rising
tension between different branches of government as they battle over
partisan economic priorities, the scope of the social service net, and, most
notably, the budget. In January 2019, the longest government shutdown
in the country’s history ended with President Trump unable to secure
significant congressional funding for a border wall necessary for national
security reasons.554 Undeterred, President Trump declared a national emergency
and proposed transferring money from other federal budgetary sources,
including the federal asset forfeiture fund, the military construction fund,
and the military antidrug account to subsidize this endeavor.555 Critics
argued the Presidential action was contrary to congressional intent,556 potentially
triggered a dangerous precedent for future Presidents, and possibly disrupted
the balance of power between two branches of government.557
Even Congress responded. Citing the constitutional significance of
separation of powers, Congress passed a joint resolution558 opposing the

552. Id.
553. Erin Hawley, Obama’s Curtain Call: A Look Back on a Legacy of Executive
Overreach, HILL (Dec. 24, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/theadministration/311608-obamas-curtain-call-a-look-back-on-a-legacy-of [https://perma.cc/
6W45-7VLX].
554. Associated Press, Trump Says ‘Wall’ Must Be Part of Lawmakers’ Border Deal,
KPBS (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.kpbs.org/news/2019/jan/30/trump-says-wall-must-bepart-lawmakers-border-deal [https://perma.cc/JVW4-PTTL].
555. Charlie Savage & Robert Pear, 16 States Sue to Stop Trump’s Use of Emergency
Powers to Build Border Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/
18/us/politics/national-emergency-lawsuits-trump.html [https://perma.cc/BUJ6-WXPD].
556. See, e.g., Alan Fram, Democrats Prepare Resolution Against Trump’s Declaration,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/f959b48ccf00424ead5097
ee01877456 [https://perma.cc/2U2Z-7GAV].
557. See Peter Baker, Emily Cochrane & Maggie Haberman, As Congress Passes
Spending Bill, Trump Plans National Emergency to Build Border Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/us/politics/trump-national-emergencyborder.html [https://perma.cc/L7CD-QPK3].
558. Originally, the National Emergencies Act of 1976 empowered Congress to
terminate a national emergency following a resolution passed in both houses. See generally
National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2012)). Interestingly, subsequent executive administrations
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use of a national emergency as a vehicle to shift funding for border
security.559 On March 15, 2019, President Trump vetoed this legislative
initiative for attempting to block his funding maneuver as allowed by
statute.560 Considering Congress lacked the votes to overcome the
Presidential veto, the President could successfully steer funding to border
security contrary to the congressional budget allocation.561 Now, Congress
is considering future legislation that limits the use of the national emergency,
hoping to curb executive power.562
Similarly, some Presidential critics challenged this recent executive
action through the courts, asserting that the Presidential initiative violated
separation of powers.563 On May 30, 2019, a federal district court judge
in Oakland, California, issued an injunction preventing the Trump administration
from transferring the Department of Defense funding dedicated for
combatting illegal drugs to building a border wall.564 A coalition of groups
filed the action, asserting Congress did not authorize this particular $2.5
billion Pentagon earmark for constructing a border wall and the administration’s
effort to redirect the funding violated separation of powers.565 On July 26,
2019, however, the U.S. Supreme Court nullified the lower court injunction
and—at least momentarily—allowed the Trump administration to fund

complained that this legislative power resembled a “legislative veto,” which violated
separation of powers. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 273 (1993). The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the legislative
veto was unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). The Court’s
holding prompted the law to change, allowing Congress to terminate a national emergency
declaration only after passing a joint resolution, which required Presidential signature.
See Savage & Pear, supra note 555.
559. Fram, supra note 556; Carl Hulse, After Veto, Some Lawmakers See a New
Emergency: Fixing the Act Trump Invoked, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/03/16/us/politics/trump-veto-emergency-act.html [https://perma.cc/
BWK7-DBJ8]; Paul Owen, Senate Set to Reject Trump’s National Emergency Declaration,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2019, 5:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/05/
senate-to-reject-trump-national-emergency-declaration [https://perma.cc/KTS8-9RPX].
560. Hulse, supra note 559.
561. Id.
562. Id.; see National Emergencies Act, 90 Stat. 1255.
563. Savage & Pear, supra note 555.
564. Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court Lets Trump Use Disputed Funds for
Border Wall, REUTERS (July 26, 2019, 3:36 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usacourt-wall-idUSKCN1UL2S7 [https://perma.cc/6TH5-KYE3].
565. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 2019). The coalition filing
the suit is the Southern Border Communities Coalition group, which includes a variety of
groups claiming to advocate on behalf of individuals residing near the border and the Sierra
Club. Id. The longtime environmental organization fears the proposed wall jeopardizes
the habitat for a variety of species living in the southern United States and northern Mexico
area. Hurley, supra note 564.
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the wall as proposed after finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to file
the lawsuit.566
Additionally, sixteen states, including California, New York, Hawaii,
and Oregon, pursued legal action against the President in the same federal
district court, claiming he lacked the authority to divert funding when
spending is a congressional responsibility.567 Despite the chorus of multiple,
heated accusations condemning the funding maneuver, existing congressional
legislation allowed this executive action.568 Equally significant, the statutory
language only broadly defined the scope of a national emergency and did
not specify any prerequisites prior to an Executive declaration.569
Trump’s decision to act pursuant to congressional statute is distinguishable
from Roosevelt’s conduct involving the Air Mail Affair. While Roosevelt
and his administration purported to act under statutory authority, the New
Deal era President flagrantly ignored the written notice and forty-five-day
hearing requirements both specified in the airline contracts as well as
contained in the congressionally enacted McNary-Watres Act.570 While
the former President clung to § 3950 as justifying his conduct, at least one
federal court concluded that even this statute implied a notice and hearing
requirement.571 Roosevelt provided neither. Future Executives must resist
exceeding their authority and resist usurping the authority of another branch
of government, all conduct that threatens constitutional democracy.

566. Hurley, supra note 564.
567. California v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 928, 935–36, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2019). On
June 19, the court allowed the U.S. House of Representatives leave to file an amicus curiae
brief, ostensibly supporting the multiple state initiated legal action. Order Granting Consent
Motion for Leave to File Memorandum of the United States House of Representatives as
Amicus Curiae, Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 928 (No. 19-cv-00872-HSG). Also filing lawsuits in
opposition to the executive action, the watchdog group Public Citizen as well as the Center
for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund were
all pursuing relief in the courts. Savage & Pear, supra note 555.
568. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, §§ 201, 301, 90 Stat. 1255,
1255, 1257 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1631 (2012)).
569. See Savage & Pear, supra note 555; see also National Emergencies Act §§ 201, 301,
90 Stat. at 1255, 1257. The Act simply required the President to specify the legal
provision authorizing executive action and notify Congress of the declaration. National
Emergencies Act § 301, 90 Stat. at 1257.
570. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 656 (1942) (quoting McNary-Watres
Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930)).
571. Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
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IX. JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES
President Roosevelt violated both separation of powers and due process
when taking the air carrier’s five route certificates. Roosevelt was
bolstered by several factors. Specifically, the Black committee concluded
that the airmail contracts were fraudulently obtained,572 the Postal Solicitor
recommended cancellation,573 and public opinion was inflamed. Regardless,
he exceeded his Presidential authority.
The Constitution empowers Congress to “establish Post Offices and
post Roads”574 and oversee mail handling.575 Here, Congress fulfilled its
role as entrusted by the Constitution. Pursuant to McNary-Watres legislation
signed April 29, 1930, the Postmaster General could exchange a mail carrier’s
contract for an air certificate for up to ten years from the date of the
original contract and following two years of satisfactory service.576 Under
this legislation, Congress further restructured the payment schedule when
endorsing Brown’s space-weight method over the previous method.577
Instead of compensating carriers for the weight amount of mail transported,
the carriers were compensated for the amount of transportation space
available, allowing them to carry passengers.578 Further, this legislation
authorized the Postmaster General to award extensions or consolidate
routes when in the public interest.579
While Congress conferred some responsibility for mail service to the
Postmaster General, it never transferred this constitutionally prescribed
function to the executive branch.580 But arguing executive action was
necessary, President Roosevelt directed the contract annulment anyway,
asserting authority over the responsibilities prescribed to a separate branch of
government.581
After participating in a conference at the White House582 Postmaster
General Farley technically announced the annulment under Order No.
4959 issued February 9, 1934;583 however, this was undeniably President
Roosevelt’s decision. On the same day, the President issued Executive Order
572. BLACK, supra note 11, at 321.
573. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 747–48.
574. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
575. Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 768.
576. McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259–60 (1930).
577. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 690, 769–71 (quoting McNary-Watres Act, 46
Stat. at 259).
578. Id. at 769.
579. McNary-Watres Act, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. at 259–60.
580. See id. at 259.
581. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 748.
582. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443.
583. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 744.
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6591, directing the Air Corps to transport the mail as well as instructing
both the commerce and war departments to assist with this effort by
providing equipment, land, and even employees.584 Further, Roosevelt
chose the air carrier’s final day transporting the mail as February 19 after
overruling the Postmaster General who requested postponing this event
until early June.585 Even the media described this as Roosevelt’s decision
with The Washington Post reporting that “President Roosevelt yesterday
directed the cancellation of all air mail contracts.”586
Arguments concerning one branch of government intruding on the
duties of another branch of government are closely scrutinized by the
Supreme Court. At this time in history, the Supreme Court repeatedly
struck down both legislative and executive attempts to transfer legislative
powers to the executive branch, finding these attempts unconstitutional.587
The postal duty is a responsibility delegated to Congress by the
Constitution 588 and when Roosevelt acted, he lacked congressional
authorization.589 Likewise, when proceeding against the air carriers under
§ 3950 Roosevelt denied the Pacific Air plaintiffs an opportunity to be
heard, which at least one court described as unconstitutional.590 For these
reasons, the Pacific Air court was justified in deciding differently.
Applying the relevant case law, and the applicable statutes, and after
considering the commentary following the Air Mail Affair, both President
Roosevelt and Postmaster Farley should have reacted differently, even if
intent on responding to the concerns voiced in the Black commission
proceedings. First, Roosevelt should have resisted inserting himself into
the Air Mail Affair, thus preventing any criticisms about intruding, tainting
the outcome, and assuming a responsibility delegated to Congress. The
air certificates were agreements between the carriers and the Postmaster
General, not the President. By overreaching, he exceeded his authority and
affected the outcome. His conduct prompted drastic consequences. He

584. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934).
585. BLACK, supra note 11, at 321; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
586. Dure, supra note 125, at A1.
587. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 296–97 (1936); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
588. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
589. See Exec. Order No. 6591, 3 PUB. PAPERS at 93.
590. E.g., Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
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replaced commercial aviation with the public sector, which was unprepared
for this responsibility.
Second, Postmaster Farley should have demonstrated a proper, measured,
and proportionate response to the issue. Following an objective review of
the credible evidence, he should have moved to identify the carriers actually
deserving of contract cancellation, sanction, or less drastic action instead
of revoking all the contracts affecting more than thirty carriers and
condemning the entire industry, as Lindbergh asserted.591 By moving
against all the carriers, not just those implicated of wrongdoing, the Postmaster
General threatened the viability of the emerging aviation industry. Failing
to recognize that his action prompted consequences, the Postmaster General
must appreciate his decision invited ripple effects within the industry,
quite possibly even extending into the broader economy.
Third, the Postmaster General should have proceeded under an appropriate
legal cause of action, not § 3950, which denied Fifth Amendment due
process rights.592 Instead, he should have acted under a breach of contract
claim, thus providing the affected carriers with the written notice and
opportunity to be heard pursuant to their agreement.593 This is a more fair
and equitable course of action than proceeding against the implicated air
carriers under a statute that does not afford them an opportunity to respond
to a unilateral decision affecting a significant property interest.
X. CONCLUSION
The airmail certificates were negotiated between the Postmaster General
and the separate air carriers, yet Roosevelt directed the outcome. He abolished
the agreements, thrusted airmail delivery on an ill-equipped and unprepared
Air Corps., and then reversed himself following tragic consequences. Among
other criticisms, the Black commission and the Roosevelt administration
philosophically disliked the fee structure and the subsidies enacted in
McNary-Watres.594 However, this legislation was “deliberately designed
to build up an air transport system of financially sound and experienced
companies which would . . . become self-supporting.”595 Emboldened by
the new 1930 legislation, Brown embraced the challenge to improve the
air transportation system and grow the economy, aiming to both eliminate
irresponsible carriers while consolidating the numerous smaller air carriers
591. Libby, supra note 18, at 45.
592. See Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767.
593. See Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 656 (1942) (quoting
McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930)).
594. Special Committee to Investigate Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, supra
note 276.
595. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 445.
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into larger, more efficient, financially secure carriers capable of providing
a quality product.596
Unsurprisingly, Brown’s detractors criticized his decision-making when
he encouraged different carriers to merge, but this is exactly the same kind
of strategic move that occurred in a different transportation industry. About
this time, the Interstate Commerce Commission forced “the consolidation of
railroads into a few major systems.”597 Even when deciding against the
airlines in his concurring opinion, Judge John Marvin Jones recognized
the challenging circumstances facing the individuals involved in the Air
Mail Affair: “This was a great new industry in which the country was vitally
interested. Its development was fraught with risks and losses and called
for daring as well as vision.”598 Although Roosevelt, the Black committee,
and others impugned Brown and the air carriers, Commissioner Akers at
least was very clear when finding the former Postmaster General acted
within the law.599
Of course, any conduct violating the public trust is indefensible. Steering
contracts, committing fraud, and conspiring against a competitive bidding
process are as misguided as the government disregarding due process of
law. When acting arbitrarily and unjustly,600 the government undermines
people’s faith in the judicial system and shakes their confidence in the
foundation of government.
Lindbergh’s concerns about a government exceeding its authority and
failing to follow our established laws remain relevant today. As we move
forward, a government functioning outside the constitutional framework
will create future challenges, present potential pitfalls, and test our resolve
to ensure the different branches operate within the scope of their respective
responsibilities. Among other observations, the courts must remain attentive
to these issues surfacing on the horizon. Further, future Executives and
government agencies need to resist exceeding their constitutional authority
influenced by ideological leanings and defer to the experience of the
596. Rubin, supra note 6, at 570–71.
597. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 440.
598. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 793 (Jones, J., concurring).
599. After hearing over sixty-three days of evidence on this matter, the Commissioner
did not find that Brown acted improperly. Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 259–60,
271. In fact, Commissioner Akers found that these contracts were awarded following
proper competitive bidding procedures, and the evidence failed to corroborate the government’s
assertion that plaintiff airlines received contracts through fraud or collusion. Id. at 271.
600. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 256 (1907) (citing Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
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legislature when applicable. Conversely, the legislature needs to resist
transferring too much authority and responsibility to executive agencies
and disallow ideological opinions to shape this decision-making.
Among other lessons, the Air Mail Affair encourages deference to
legislative expertise, somewhat similar to the court deferring to legal precedent.
When Roosevelt abruptly entered his Executive order, Congress had a
lengthy history studying the aviation industry. Roosevelt substituted his
limited exposure to the airmail issue with the experience of numerous
individuals, serving multiple terms, while studying this evolving industry
and benefiting from a broad range of information including congressional
testimony.601 Acting on this knowledge, Congress passed multiple pieces
of legislation as early as 1916 through McNary-Watres in 1930.602
This challenge will not disappear as future officeholders interpret their
duties more broadly than others, pushing the boundaries of their constitutional
roles. The courts must remain vigilant. Undoubtedly, judicial interpretation
is necessary to decide if future Executives and legislative bodies are migrating
onto the terrain of another branch of government. The Constitution entrusts
the judiciary with performing their duty independently, considering the
plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language and following the
law consistently. To do less is a disservice to constitutional democracy.
The Air Mail Affair signaled one of the first disputes over the scope of
government during the Roosevelt administration, as those favoring a free
market economy battled those advancing the President’s New Deal legislation.
It also signaled the first confrontation between Lindbergh and Roosevelt
with Lindbergh advocating for an economy shaped by independent, free
market forces and the President insisting government had an obligation to
impose limits on the free market to advance the general welfare of all
citizens.603 As a harbinger of things to come, this epic encounter between
two iconic figures set the stage for an ongoing debate about the evolving
New Deal legislation, the reach of an expanding government, and the
impact on future generations.
Much like his steady, resolute Spirit of St. Louis single-engine airplane
traveling the width of the Atlantic,604 Lindbergh did not stray from his
mission. He openly defied Roosevelt because the former aviator was troubled
by a government disregarding fundamental elements of the law, exceeding

601. See Berchtold, supra note 5, at 446.
602. See id. at 438–39, 445–47. The post office initially requested funding for the
airmail service in 1912, but Congress did not approve it until 1916. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl.
at 677. On May 15, 1918, Congress approved funding for the first experimental airmail route
between New York and Washington, D.C. Id.
603. See BERG, supra note 3, at 291–92, 295–96.
604. The Flight, supra note 1.
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its executive authority, and intruding on industry.605 When President Roosevelt
canceled the contracts, he unfairly condemned the commercial aviation
industry that had developed the best air transportation system in the world.606
His misguided action caused economic damage that almost triggered “the
demise of the airline industry.”607
When speaking out against government overreach, Lindbergh advocated
for a government constrained by the Constitution, as well as for a business
environment conducive to creativity, development, and innovation. The
country’s democracy, system of governance, and even the rule of law depends
upon honoring the Constitution. When disregarding the Constitution, the
system fails. Thomas Jefferson recognized the significance of separation
of powers and strongly advocated for a government of limited powers
when he wrote: “[I]t is the duty of the general government to guard its
subordinate members from the encroachments of each other, even when
they are made through error or inadvertence, and to cover its citizens from
the exercise of powers not authorized by the law.”608

605. JAMES P. DUFFY, LINDBERGH VS. ROOSEVELT: THE RIVALRY THAT DIVIDED AMERICA
16–17 (2010).
606. Lindbergh asserted that “the United States . . . is far in the lead in almost every
branch of commercial aviation.” Libby, supra note 18, at 45. Others corroborated Lindbergh’s
claim. Kenneth P. Werrell asserts that the “American air transport[ation] and the air mail
system [were] the envy of the world” at this time in history. Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.
Likewise, a European aviation periodical concluded, ‘“No other country can show as high
a standard of speed, regularity and safety’ as the American airmail system.” Id. (quoting
Briton Lauds U.S. Air Mail Service, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1934, at AS10).
607. Michael A. Katz, The American Experience Under the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978—An Airline Perspective, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 87, 87 (1988).
608. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on Certain Proceedings of the Executive in the
Northwestern Territory, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 88, 88 (Albert Ellery
Bergh ed., 1907).
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